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Abstract 
 
This paper presents and evaluates pharmaceutical policies in the EU aimed at the rational use of 
medicines and at keeping pharmaceutical spending under control. Policy makers are growing more 
aware that by regulating pharmaceutical markets correctly, considerable savings can be achieved 
without compromising the quality of care. Specifically, the paper makes the case that, by following 
numerous best-practices in pharmaceutical sector regulations, the value for money of pharmaceutical 
consumption could be substantially increased. Appropriate regulations can be relevant for pricing, 
reimbursement, market entry and expenditure control, as well as specific policies targeted at the 
distribution chain, physicians and patients.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper describes and attempts to evaluate pharmaceutical policies in the EU with a focus 
on cost-containment. The paper pins down those policies which favour the rational use of 
medicinal products
1
 and contribute to control public expenditure. Its purpose is to provide 
evidence-based guidance for elaborating country-specific pharmaceutical policies. While 
country specificities can be observed, there is a basket of core pricing and reimbursement 
policies, directed at providers and users,  are being put in place to encourage a more rational 
use of medicines.  Given the fiscal impact of the economic and financial crisis and the 
projected costs of an ageing population
2
, these policies are of increasing interest to the public 
healthcare payers and are assessed in this paper. 
Medicinal products for human use are defined as substances or combination of substances 
presented for treating or preventing diseases in human beings. Demand for pharmaceuticals is 
sizeable and the potential benefits of pharmaceutical consumption have been reportedly 
significant (Cutler 2006, Lichtenberg 2010). However, these benefits come at a substantial 
direct cost. In the EU, public and private outpatient pharmaceutical spending accounts for 
roughly 16% of total expenditure on health care and 1.6% of GDP (Table 1). Public 
expenditure alone represents about 1.1% of GDP in 2010. After the USA, the EU is the 
second biggest pharmaceutical market with a share of 27% of worldwide turnover in sales, 
totalling € 192 billion in 2010 (IMS 2011a, BPI 2011).  
Because pharmaceutical expenditure is increasing, pharmaceutical policies aiming at cost-
containment are more and more in the focus of national health authorities and European 
policy makers. Policy makers are growing more aware that, by regulating pharmaceutical 
markets correctly, savings can be achieved without compromising the quality of care.
3
 This is 
why policies promoting the use of generic medicines are often at the forefront in the attempt 
of increasing the cost-effectiveness of medicinal products. 
At the European level, many initiatives related to the pharmaceutical sector have been 
undertaken. These include recommendations and directives, among others on the transparency 
of pricing and reimbursement procedures
4
 and the safety and efficacy of medicines
5
. Other 
                                                 
1
 In this publication, the terms medicinal or pharmaceutical products, pharmaceuticals and medicines are used 
interchangeably.  
2
 See EC(DG ECFIN)-EPC (AWG), "The 2012 Ageing Report – Economic and budgetary projections for the 27 
EU Member States (2010-2060)", European Economy, No 2/2012.  
3
 A key opportunity in this respect is generic medicines. Generics are therapeutic alternatives to originator 
medicines. They are as effective (Aaserud et al. 2009), but on average three to four times cheaper than the 
respective off-patent originals. In the next four years, up to 40% of currently patent protected pharmaceuticals 
will be available to generic medicines, creating a huge savings potential (IMS 2010). 
4
 Directive 89/105/EEC relating to the transparency of measures regulating the pricing and reimbursement of 
medicinal products for human use. 
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initiatives relate to the assessment of cost-effectiveness of pharmaceutical spending by 
fostering common best practices in health-technology analyses
6
. The "Joint EC(ECFIN)-EPC 
Report on Health Systems"
7
 by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
(DG ECFIN) and the Economic Policy Committee (European Commission 2010) has stressed  
the need to keep public budgets under control through targeted policies promoting the rational 
use of pharmaceuticals. This has also been pointed to extensively by the High Level 
Pharmaceutical Forum
8
, the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry
9
 by DG Competition (European 
Commission 2009), the report on pricing and reimbursement systems in Europe”10 funded by 
DG Enterprise and Industry (Espin 2007) and the PPRI initiative
11
 partly funded by DG 
Health and Consumers.  
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, a snap-shot of the evolution and the current 
situation of outpatient pharmaceutical spending in the EU is presented (section 2). Secondly, 
an overview of the main pharmaceutical policies in the EU Member States is given (section 
3). A more detailed examination of the application and impact of individual policies is 
presented in sections 4 - 16. The most frequent past and recent reforms and their reported 
impact are documented in section 17, while policy options for the EU are evaluated in section 
18. Section 19 draws conclusions.  
2. Pharmaceutical spending in the EU – Evolution and current status 
Medicines are consumed in the inpatient (mostly hospitals) and outpatient (mostly 
pharmacies) sector. However, comparable cross-country data on pharmaceutical spending is 
not available for the inpatient sector for most of the EU Member States.
12
 Consequently, the 
paper describes and analyses expenditure on outpatient pharmaceuticals.
13
 Total, i.e. public 
and private, spending on outpatient pharmaceuticals varied from 0.6 to 2.6% of GDP in 2010 
                                                                                                                                                        
5 E.g. the European Medicines Agency (EMA) being responsible for the evaluation and supervision of medicines 
for human and veterinary use: http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/ 
6
 E.g. EUnetHTA, increasing the collaboration of national health-technology assessment agencies at European 
level: http://www.eunethta.eu. At the current moment, EUNetHTA is limited to studying effectiveness i.e. it 
excludes cost-effectiveness. 
7
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2010/pdf/ocp74_en.pdf 
8
 http://ec.europa.eu/pharmaforum/docs/final_conclusions_en.pdf 
9
 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf 
10
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/healthcare/files/docs/study_pricing_2007/andalusian_school_public_healt
h_report_pricing_2007_en.pdf 
11
 http://ppri.goeg.at/ 
12
 The inpatient sector relates to hospitals, nursing and residential care facilities. The outpatient sector covers 
also the services of ambulatory health care. 
13
 The OECD has started providing specific data for inpatient pharmaceutical spending only recently and for a 
limited number of countries. Inpatient pharmaceutical spending adds another 15% of spending on average in 
OECD countries. 
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(EU: 1.6%) (Table 1).
14
 Since the 1990s, it has increased as a share of GDP in all EU Member 
States except for Luxembourg. Countries with high total pharmaceutical expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP (e.g. those above 2% of GDP) include Bulgaria, Greece, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Portugal and Slovakia. Those with low pharmaceutical expenditure in terms of 
GDP, as well as a percentage of total health expenditures, include Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Sweden and the UK. In the EU, between 7.7 and 35.3% of total spending on 
health is accounted for by outpatient pharmaceutical spending. There is no overall trend, as to 
what percentage of total health care spending is devoted to pharmaceuticals.  
Public spending on outpatient pharmaceuticals varied from 0.3 to 1.7% of GDP in 2010 (EU: 
1.1%). Since the 1990s, it has increased as a share of GDP for all countries in the EU except 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Luxembourg, Italy, Poland and  
Sweden. Some countries, such as Germany, Greece, Spain, France and Slovakia, have 
relatively high public spending on pharmaceuticals and a relatively low share of private co-
payment. Bulgaria, Denmark, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania spend relatively little 
public money on pharmaceuticals in terms of GDP. Except for Luxembourg, this is because 
the private share in total pharmaceutical spending is relatively high. 
Whilst health care in EU Member States is to a large extent publicly funded, this is less the 
case for pharmaceutical spending, where private co-payment can be extensive. Still, public 
spending is considerable. In the EU, around 60% of total pharmaceutical spending is public 
spending. It is predominantly private in Bulgaria, Estonia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland and Romania (Table 2). For Member States with available long-term data, it appears 
that the public share in total spending went up for some (e.g. Germany, Netherlands, Finland, 
UK) and down for others (Czech Republic, Slovakia), with no apparent overall trend for the 
EU.  
The variation in spending as a share of GDP conceals a much more considerable variation in 
total and per capita spending. As expected, given the size of the population, in 2010, Germany 
was the biggest pharmaceutical market in the EU (Euro 42,383 million), followed by France 
(€ 36,006 million), Italy (€ 24,872 million), Spain (€ 18, 500 million), and UK (€ 18,154 
million) (Table 1). These five countries account for over 70% of pharmaceutical turnover in 
the EU. In per capita terms, between 152 Euro PPS (Romania) and 492 Euro PPS (Germany) 
are spent annually (EU: 409 Euro PPS). Public per capita expenditure varies between 46 in 
Bulgaria and 403 Euro PPS in Ireland (EU: 283). Both total and public per capita expenditure 
have increased considerably over the last decades. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Differences in spending on outpatient pharmaceuticals may results partly from differences in accounting 
standards, such that some expensive pharmaceuticals may be accounted for in some countries in hospitals and in 
other countries in pharmacies. 
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Table 1 – Evolution of total (public and private) outpatient pharmaceutical expenditure (1970 – 2010) 
  
Total expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals (in 
million Euro)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010* 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010* 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010* 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010* 2010*
Belgium 3.9 6.3 7.2 8.1 10.5 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.6 1.7 : : : : 15.8 27   90   189  : 482  5,926                    
Bulgaria : : 4.9 6.1 6.9 : : : : 2.4 : : : : 35.3 : : : : 250  857                       
Czech Republic : : 4.1 6.2 7.3 : : 1.0 1.5 1.5 : : 24.2 24.7 20.4 : : 106  200  288  2,217                    
Denmark : 8.6 8.2 8.1 10.7 : 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 : 6.3   7.6   9.0   7.7   : 44   104  182  255  1,942                    
Germany 5.7 8.1 8.0 9.9 11.2 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.7 17.0 13.9 14.7 14.1 15.3 28   104  226  316  492  42,383                  
Estonia : : : 5.2 6.3 : : : 1.2 1.4 : : : 22.8 22.0 : : : : 217  198                       
Ireland 5.1 7.7 5.8 5.7 8.9 : 0.9 0.7 0.9 1.7 : 11.7 12.8 15.1 19.1 : : : : 528  2,646                    
Greece** 5.4 5.9 6.6 7.5 10.5 1.4 1.1 0.9 1.5 2.1 : : 14.9 19.9 19.6 31   76   109  239  432  4,515                    
Spain 3.2 5.1 6.3 7.0 9.3 : 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.8 : 21.8 18.6 22.0 18.8 : 62   140  284  431  18,500                  
France 5.3 6.9 8.2 9.8 11.2 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.9 24.4 16.4 17.3 16.9 16.5 30   87   219  365  488  36,006                  
Italy : : 7.3 7.7 8.8 : : 1.6 1.8 1.6 : : 21.4 23.1 17.9 : : 247  394  393  24,872                  
Cyprus 2.7 2.8 4.5 5.3 5.8 : : : : 1.3 : : : : 21.6 : : : : 304  218                       
Latvia : 2.1 2.5 6.0 6.0 : : : : 1.3 : : : : 21.5 : : : : 180  293                       
Lithuania : : 3.3 6.5 7.5 : : : : 2.0 : : : : 26.6 : : : : 254  528                       
Luxembourg 3.1 5.2 5.4 5.8 6.2 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 : : : 11.1 10.0 : : : 243  432  246                       
Hungary : : : 6.8 7.6 : : : : 2.6 : : : : 34.6 : : : : 414  2,544                    
Malta : : : 6.0 6.9 : : : : 1.6 : : : : 22.8 : : : : 306  92                        
Netherlands : 7.0 7.5 7.6 11.2 : 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 : 8.4   10.2 12.3 10.2 : 47   122  238  370  6,715                    
Austria 4.9 7.1 7.8 9.4 10.4 : : 0.8 1.2 1.3 : : 10.6 13.0 12.6 : : 144  302  404  3,761                    
Poland : : 4.4 5.3 6.5 : : : : 1.6 : : : : 24.3 : : : : 242  5,613                    
Portugal 2.4 5.0 5.8 8.5 9.8 0.3 1.1 1.5 2.0 2.0 14.2 21.0 25.3 23.4 19.7 : 40   139  293  404  3,450                    
Romania : : 2.9 5.2 5.6 : : : : 1.5 : : : : 26.9 : : : : 152  1,816                    
Slovenia : : : 8.2 8.6 : : : : 1.8 : : : : 20.3 : : : : 363  621                       
Slovakia : : : 5.4 8.5 : : : 1.9 2.4 : : : 34.7 28.0 : : : 126  427  1,567                    
Finland 5.1 6.0 7.4 6.9 8.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.1 1.2 13.8 11.2 9.9   15.5 14.6 15   49   116  238  348  2,216                    
Sweden 6.8 8.9 7.7 7.8 9.1 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.2 : : 8.6   14.5 13.3 13   50   115  275  365  4,212                    
United Kingdom 4.2 5.3 5.5 6.7 9.1 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.0 15.8 13.5 14.5 14.8 11.0 15   49   117  : 305  18,154                  
EU 5.0 6.9 7.2 8.2 9.9 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 19.0 14.3 15.9 16.5 15.7 25   77   187  321  409  192,108                
EU - unweighted average 4.4 6.1 6.0 7.0 8.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.6 17.0 13.8 15.0 18.1 19.5 23   63   150  264  353  192,108                
Total current expenditure on 
health (% GDP)
Total expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals (% GDP)
Total expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals (as % total 
current health expenditure) 
Total per capita expenditure on 
pharmaceutials (in purchasing 
power standards)
 
Source: Eurostat, OECD Health Data 2012, Commission services (DG ECFIN). 
Notes: * 2010 or latest data. ** For Greece, preliminary 2010 data. Public as % of total expenditure on pharmaceuticals is calculated as the ratio 
between public and total spending expressed in Euro (and not e.g. as % of GDP). Country-specific GDP's are used to compute EU weighted 
averages. 
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Table 2 – Evolution of public outpatient pharmaceutical expenditure (1970 – 2010) 
  
Public expenditure 
on pharmaceuticals 
(in million Euro)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010* 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010* 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010* 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010* 2010*
Belgium : : : 6.6 8.0 0.6 0.6 0.5 : 1.1 16 51 89 : 305 55 55 45 : 63 3,754                   
Bulgaria : : 5.2 3.7 4.4 : : : : 0.4 : : : : 48 : : : : 18 156                      
Czech Republic : : 4.6 5.9 6.3 : : 0.9 1.2 0.9 : : 94 153 184 : : 90 80 64 1,412                   
Denmark : 7.9 6.9 6.8 9.5 : 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 : 22 35 89 134 : 60 33 57 53 1,023                   
Germany 4.4 6.6 6.3 8.2 8.9 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.3 18 77 165 228 376 60 73 : 71 76 32,397                 
Estonia : : : 4.1 5.0 : : : 0.5 0.7 : : : : 106 : : : 42 49 97                        
Ireland 4.1 6.8 4.4 4.6 6.4 : 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.3 : : : : 403 : 56 71 67 76 2,020                   
Greece** 2.3 3.3 3.5 4.7 5.6 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.8 15 47 61 150 495 57 64 56 60 89 4,000                   
Spain 2.3 4.2 5.1 5.2 7.1 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.3 14 38 101 210 312 : 64 67 73 72 13,380                 
France 4.1 5.6 6.4 8.0 9.0 0.9 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 20 57 136 245 334 69 64 64 65 68 24,545                 
Italy : : 6.1 5.8 7.2 : : 0.9 0.8 0.8 : : 150 176 190 : : 56 44 48 12,029                 
Cyprus 0.9 1.5 1.8 2.4 3.1 : : : : 0.3 : : : : 75 : : : : 24 52                        
Latvia : : 2.5 3.2 4.1 : : : : 0.5 : : : : 67 : : : : 38 110                      
Lithuania : : 3.0 4.5 5.6 : : : : 0.8 : : : : 98 : : : : 39 204                      
Luxembourg 2.8 4.8 5.0 5.2 6.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 : : : 199 364 83 88 88 83 84 206                      
Hungary : : : 5.0 5.0 : : : 1.2 1.3 : : : 130 200 : : : : 48 1,227                   
Malta : : : 4.9 5.8 : : : : 1.0 : : : : 192 : : : : 61 57                        
Netherlands : 5.1 5.4 5.0 9.5 : 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.9 : 31 81 138 292 : 67 63 56 79 5,297                   
Austria 3.3 5.1 6.1 7.6 8.4 : : 0.4 0.8 0.9 : : 75 202 271 : : 50 67 67 2,515                   
Poland : : 4.4 3.9 5.0 : : : 0.6 0.6 : : : 56 97 : : : : 40 2,247                   
Portugal 1.5 3.4 3.8 6.4 7.1 0.2 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.2 : 30 86 165 243 67 64 60 55 62 2,146                   
Romania : : 2.9 3.6 4.7 : : : : 0.8 : : : : 94 : : : : 56 1,021                   
Slovenia 4.2 4.4 5.6 6.1 6.6 : : : : 1.0 : : : : 203 : : : : 56 347                      
Slovakia : : : 4.9 6.0 : : : 1.5 1.7 : : : 104 296 : : : 79 69 1,086                   
Finland 4.1 5.0 6.2 5.1 6.6 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.7 5 23 55 115 191 29 43 43 45 55 1,219                   
Sweden 5.8 8.2 7.4 7.0 7.7 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.7 8 36 82 192 210 75 67 71 73 57 2,416                   
United Kingdom 3.9 5.0 4.9 5.6 8.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.9 10 33 78 : 255 57 71 63 80 90 16,339                 
EU 4.0 5.7 5.8 6.7 8.1 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 16 52 121 199 285 58 58 58 54 60 114,963                
EU - unweighted average 3.4 5.1 4.9 5.3 6.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.1 13 40 92 159 223 61 64 61 65 60 114,963                
Public current expenditure on 
health  (% GDP)
Public expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals (% GDP)
Public per capita expenditure on 
pharmaceutials (in purchasing 
power standards)
Public as % of total expenditure 
on pharmaceuticals
 
Source: Eurostat, OECD Health Data 2012, Commission services (DG ECFIN).  
Notes: See Table 1. 
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3. Overview of pharmaceutical policies 
This section briefly describes the most common pharmaceutical policies in the EU. A more 
detailed account of the characteristics, rationale, application and impact of these policies is 
given in the following sections. 
Next to income and health care needs, it is the regulatory framework of pharmaceutical 
markets which determines the level and quality of pharmaceutical spending. Regulating 
pharmaceutical markets comes as an answer to classical market failures of health care 
markets. Adverse selection, moral hazard and asymmetric information are the main well-
known economic rationales for public sector regulations of health care markets, based on 
efficiency and equity considerations.
15
 Regulations are many, but despite national 
idiosyncrasies, there is a basket of core pricing and reimbursement policies common to many 
EU Member States promoting the rational use of pharmaceuticals. These policies are of rising 
interest to the public payers and are explored in this paper. 
Pharmaceutical policies are related to pricing, reimbursement, market entry and expenditure 
control (Table 3), as well as targeted at specific agents such as distributors, physicians and 
patients (Table 4).
16
  
In most EU Member States, prices of pharmaceuticals are set through external reference 
pricing (ERP).
17
 ERP establishes a price on the basis of prices of the same product in other 
countries. Mostly, price controls apply to reimbursable medicines, whereas non-reimbursable 
medicines are usually priced freely. Also, prices are set by the pricing authorities alone or are 
negotiated between the manufacturers and the pricing authority. Governments may make 
pricing conditional on the evidence of the value added of innovations relative to existing 
treatment options via health-technology assessment (HTA) (see section 5). Also, external 
reference pricing and HTA may be combined to guide pricing decisions. 
Policies of product reimbursement define the maximum price reimbursable by third party 
payers (internal reference pricing). In addition, positive and negative lists may be defined to 
specify which pharmaceuticals are reimbursed or explicitly excluded from public 
reimbursement. Positive and negative lists are revised over time according to new 
information. The timing for market entry for reimbursable medicines depends (partially) on 
                                                 
15
 Among the market failures are adverse selection (insurance companies attract patients with lower health risks), 
moral hazard (insured people may over-consume health care services), and asymmetric information (physicians 
may know health needs of the patients better than the patient himself, leading to supply-induced demand). 
16
 The distinction is not clear-cut, as some policies affect multiple agents at the same time.  
17
 Denmark, Sweden, Germany and UK apply to a varying degree free pricing, which allows the producers to set 
the price at launch without restrictions. However, these countries regulate either profits of companies (UK) 
or/and apply reimbursement regulations. Since 2012, Germany selectively applies external reference pricing as 
one pricing criterion. 
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the pricing and reimbursement procedures, which may delay the market entry of new 
medicines.
18
 
Policies may also aim directly at controlling expenditure. This may be done through price 
freezes and cuts, mandatory discounts and rebates granted by producers and distributors of 
pharmaceuticals to purchasers. Payback/clawback policies aim at preventing budget 
overshooting, by claiming refunds from the industry once a target budget is exceeded. 
Increasingly, public tendering is used to increase price competition and to reduce purchase 
prices. 
Further policies are targeted towards wholesalers, pharmacists, physicians and patients (Table 
4). For pharmacists, generic substitution offers the right or obligation to dispense the cheapest 
equivalent - often generic - medicine.  The design of mark-ups for distributors of 
pharmaceuticals may also affect dispensing behaviour. Physicians may face a number of 
regulations: monitoring of their prescription patterns, (binding) prescription guidelines, 
budget ceilings, prescription quotas, financial (dis-)incentives and educational and 
informational policies. At the patient level, co-payment rules define the share of costs borne 
privately by the patients. Patients may also be targeted by informational campaigns. 
                                                 
18
 As described in section 7, the timing for market entry also depends on companies' decisions not to market a 
product, to deliberately postpone its introduction or to market it directly in the hospital setting only, where 
sometimes free pricing applies. 
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Table 3 – Policies related to pricing, reimbursement, market entry  
and expenditure controls 
Price regulations 
External reference pricing: ERP - also called cross-country referencing and international 
price comparison – is applied in 24 EU Member States (except Denmark, Sweden and the 
UK). It benchmarks product prices in one country against prices of the same product in a 
selected basket of other countries. 
Internal reference pricing: 20 EU Member States set the price to be paid by the public 
payers by comparing prices of equivalent or similar products in a chemical, pharmacological 
or therapeutic group. This is the system of internal reference pricing determining the 
maximum price to be reimbursed by a third payer ("reference price"). The patient pays the 
difference between the retail price and the "reference price", in addition to any co-payment 
arrangement. The "reference price" applies to all pharmaceuticals within the corresponding 
group of products. 
Price updates: Prices may be updated regularly according to pricing regulations. 
VAT: Mostly, medicines have a value-added tax below the standard VAT rate. Sometimes, 
the VAT depends on the group of pharmaceuticals. 
Product reimbursement 
Health-technology assessment: Reimbursement may be conditional on meeting specific 
clinical and/or economic (cost-) effectiveness criteria. Health-technology assessment (HTA) 
is an assessment of the additional cost-effectiveness of an innovative medicine relative to 
existing treatment alternatives. This gives evidence-based guidance to pricing (and 
reimbursement). 
Positive/negative lists: All EU Member States have positive lists specifying which specific 
pharmaceuticals are reimbursed. A few countries also have negative lists, excluding specific 
pharmaceuticals from reimbursement. 
Market entry 
Time to market entry: Pricing and reimbursement procedures may delay the market entry of 
medicines. In the EU, the time span for taking pricing and reimbursement decisions is 
regulated by the Transparency Directive. In addition, companies may deliberately choose to 
delay market entry. 
Expenditure controls 
Discounts/rebates: Discounts and rebates are imposed upon manufacturers and pharmacists, 
such that they have to return a part of their revenue. 
Clawback: Clawback policies are applied to pharmacies, requiring them to pass a part of their 
turnover to third party payers. 
Payback: Payback requires manufacturers to pay back a share of their revenue, if a pre-
specified budget ceiling for public pharmaceutical expenditures is exceeded. 
Risk-sharing arrangements: These are financial or performance-based schemes which 
trigger lower prices or refunds from the manufactures if pre-agreed targets are not reached. 
Price freezes and cuts: Prices are frozen or cut by law or as an outcome of a negotiated 
agreement. 
Public tendering: Increasingly more countries are using public procurement in the outpatient 
sector to decrease the prices of pharmaceuticals. Currently, the Netherlands and Germany are 
well known examples for ample use of public tendering. 
Sources: Espin, J. and J. Rovira (2007), PPRI (2008), Zuidberg (2010), Commission services 
(DG ECFIN). 
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Table 4 – Policies targeted at distributors, physicians and patients 
Wholesalers and Pharmacists 
Generic substitution: Pharmacists may be induced or mandated to dispense the cheapest 
bioequivalent medicine, which is often called "generic substitution". It is mandatory in 8, 
indicative in 14 and disallowed in 7 EU Member States.   
Mark-ups: 23 EU Member States* apply wholesalers' and all EU Member States apply 
pharmacists mark-ups on the price of the pharmaceuticals as set by law. These can be linear, 
regressive, a fixed-fee (NL) or fee-for-service (SI, the UK). 
Physicians 
Monitoring of prescribing behaviour: At least 22 EU Member States monitor prescription 
behaviour to some extent, e.g. by using electronic prescriptions.  
Clinical practices/prescription guidelines: Most EU Member States have indicative, non-
binding prescription guidelines for physicians. In few countries, physicians must prescribe by 
the international-non-proprietary-name (INN) instead of the medicine name. INN is 
mandatory in five, indicative in 18 and disallowed in four EU Member States. 
Pharmaceutical budgets: A maximum pharmaceutical budget may be defined per period, 
region, field of specialty and physician (at least 9 EU Member States). 
Prescription quotas: These may define a target of the percentage of generics to be prescribed 
by each physician or may target the average cost of prescriptions (at least 6 EU Member 
States). 
Financial incentives: Physicians may be incentivised or punished financially by following or 
ignoring prescription guidelines, quotas and budgets (at least 11 EU Member States). 
Education and information: Physicians may receive prescribing advice, IT decision support 
etc. This is the case in most EU Member States. 
Patients 
Information/education campaigns: Patients may be targeted by information campaigns 
raising awareness of rational use of medicines, e.g. for antibiotics and generics. 
Co-payment: Most EU Member States have co-payment, applying differentiated 
reimbursement rates, such as 100% reimbursement for essential, 80% for chronic and 60% for 
other pharmaceuticals (AT, IT, DE, NL and UK have 100% reimbursement; prescription fees 
may apply though). Often, vulnerable groups are protected from excessive out-of-pocket 
payments through specific rules. 
Sources: Espin, J. and J. Rovira (2007), PPRI (2008), Zuidberg (2010), Commission services 
(DG ECFIN). 
Notes: *MS=Member States. 
 
4. External reference pricing: popular, but impact on cost reduction is uncertain 
External reference pricing (ERP) is a direct price control. It usually takes the form of setting a 
maximum price per standardised unit, e.g. per defined daily dose (DDD),
19
 based on prices of 
the same product in other countries. The rationale is to control prices of products which are 
protected by intellectual property rights and benefit from a legal monopoly.  
In 2010, 23 EU Member States used ERP (Table 5). Denmark, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom did not use ERP, whilst Germany introduced it in 2012 for specific medicines as a 
                                                 
19
 DDD is used as a unit for measuring a prescribed amount of a pharmaceutical. 
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supporting decision criterion. Typically, prices are controlled for reimbursable products only, 
but sometimes also for non-reimbursable products. Prices are usually set at the producer's 
level (ex-factory price), and sometimes at the wholesaler's level (pharmacy purchase price, i.e. 
ex-factory price plus wholesaler's profit mark-up) or the pharmacy's level (pharmacy retail 
price, i.e. ex-factory price plus wholesaler's and pharmacist's profit mark-up plus VAT). 
Countries choose mostly the lowest or an average price within the specified basket of prices 
of other countries. The most-often referenced countries are France and Spain (referenced by 
14 EU Member States), followed by Ireland and Spain (11). The least referenced countries are 
Bulgaria, Romania and Malta (3) (Table 6). In general, each country chooses a basket of 
countries which are economically comparable and geographically close. Choosing countries 
with similar levels of economic wealth may be perceived as a good anchor for choosing a 
"correct" and affordable price level, whereas geographic closeness may ease updating pricing 
through ERP. 
The choice of referenced countries is important in determining the price level of a specific 
medicine, as listed prices of medicines vary substantially across EU Member States.
20
 
According to EUROSTAT (2007), price levels in the EU varied by 60 percentage points in 
2005 (Graph 1). East European countries had the lowest average prices (around 70% of EU 
average), whilst Germany had by far the highest price level of all EU Member States. Based 
on more recent data, Kanavos et al. (2011a) confirm that there continues to be significant 
price variation across countries. For a sample of expensive medicines, they found ex-factory 
price gaps of 93% between highest and lowest priced countries; for low priced medicines the 
gap could be much higher. By using external reference pricing, countries can import low price 
levels and generate rapid savings – however, at the risk of non-availability or delayed market 
entry of the respective product. 
Interestingly, differences in price levels are only partly related to country-specific income 
levels (Graph 1). Relative price levels, defined as pharmaceutical prices divided by GDP per 
capita, show that countries with high absolute price levels of pharmaceuticals, such as DE, 
DK, IE and IT, seem to have low relative price levels. Contrary to that, low price countries, 
such as PL, RO, BG, seem to pay relatively much compared to GDP per capita. This is partly 
because medicinal products are traded on international markets, with parallel exportation as 
an allowed market practice.
21
 This allows for price arbitrage and is a deterrent to producers to 
set prices fully in function of local purchasing power. The effect is that differences in 
pharmaceutical price levels are substantially smaller than differences in local purchasing 
power, i.e. one would expect countries with a lower GDP per capita to pay relatively lower 
pharmaceutical prices, but this is not necessarily the case. 
                                                 
20
 Based on comparative price levels for pharmaceutical products in 2005 for EU25 (Eurostat 2007). 
21
 Parallel exports have potentially detrimental effects on the availability of medicines in the exporting countries. 
It is questionable whether cross-border trade according to free market rules should fully apply to products with 
regulated prices.  
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The cost-saving potential of "importing" lower price levels from other countries through ERP 
is high. Based on the 2005 price levels and assuming that all countries above the EU average 
price level converge to it, leads to expenditure savings of 8% or an equivalent of € 15 billion 
(Graph 2). Savings in the group of countries exceeding the EU average price level are 
estimated at: above 20% or € 9 billion for Germany, 17% or Euro 332 million for Denmark 
and 15% or € 4 billion for Italy. Whilst these estimations are based on rough assumptions, 
other studies come to similar conclusions. For Germany, WIdO (2011) estimates that if 
Germany had UK price levels for high volume on-patent and generic pharmaceuticals, € 7 
billion could be saved.
22
 Thus, depending on the referenced countries, the introduction of ERP 
can lead to lower prices.  
However, achieving cost-containment through ERP is limited due to several facts. Firstly, 
comparing pharmaceutical prices is difficult because published list prices may differ 
substantially from effective prices. This is due to different pricing regimes and little price 
transparency. Profit margins for pharmacists and wholesalers and the value-added tax on 
pharmaceuticals differ across countries (see section 15). Also, the industry negotiates 
discounts with distributors of pharmaceuticals, which are not communicated to the public and 
leave listed prices unaffected. Pay-back mechanisms (see section 9) may ex-post lower the 
effective prices of pharmaceuticals, but their impact on price levels is not published. Also, 
parallel trade may lower effective prices in high price countries.
23
 Packaging also differs 
across countries, making price comparisons partially invalid. 
Secondly, the industry may adapt strategically and continuously to ERP, partially eroding the 
potential for cost-containment. The industry can launch products in countries with high 
pharmaceutical prices first (e.g. Germany). Thereby, prices may increase in all other countries 
which directly or indirectly refer to high-price countries. Moreover, the industry may avoid 
competition on prices and rather competes on discounts, which benefit wholesalers and 
pharmacies rather than consumers. These adaptation strategies result in list-price inflation and 
cross-country convergence of prices. Consequently, ERP may lead to prices being too high 
and not reflecting national market conditions.  
Thirdly, price reductions are not automatically translated into price decreases in referencing 
countries (Vogler, S. et al 2011a). This is because prices of pharmaceuticals are not reviewed 
regularly. A regular monitoring should therefore be ensured, possibly including “hidden” 
price changes, such as through discounts, which are not translated into changes of listed 
prices.  
                                                 
22
 In total, WIdO (2011) estimates € 12 billion saving potential in pharmaceutical expenditure in Germany. In 
addition to lower prices, as discussed above, € 5 billion could be saved by switching from on-patent analogue 
pharmaceuticals to lower price generics. A further € 2 billion could be saved by prescribing the lowest-price 
generic only. 
23
 Parallel trade refers to legal trade of patented pharmaceuticals from countries with low to countries with high 
pharmaceutical ex-factory prices. Kanavos and Costa-Font (2005) state that parallel trade increases the profits of 
the distribution chain rather than generating saving for health insurers or consumers. This is because imported 
pharmaceuticals are priced just below the prices of pharmaceuticals in the destination country.  
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Finally, the increasing popularity of ERP can make pricing circular. The more countries are 
used as reference countries, the less clear it becomes which country's prices are the reference 
(e.g. BE uses SK as a reference country and vice versa). Also, price revisions in one country 
may, at least in theory, trigger a sequence of (circular) price revisions, which are heavily 
criticised by the industry and which induce strategic launching of new pharmaceuticals, as 
described above. Still, ERP is a technically interesting instrument to be used, especially in 
times of economic crisis, as it may lead to rapid savings by referencing to low-price countries.  
Graph 1 - Price level index for pharmaceutical products in 2005, EU25=100 
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Source: Eurostat (2007); Commission services (DG ECFIN) 
Notes: Price level for EL not available. 
Overall, the impact of ERP on cost-containment may not always be as expected due to 
counteracting factors. On the one hand, ERP gives the authorities a tool to control prices and 
thus to set one key parameter of expenditures (besides volume). It is also a relatively 
transparent pricing method in terms of procedure. On the other hand, the objective of 
controlling expenditure may fail, if price reductions are out-balanced by volume growth. 
Moreover, one should also consider the risk that too low prices may lead to access problems, 
as companies may postpone or not introduce pharmaceuticals in low-price countries. Also, 
importing prices of other countries implies importing their health care priorities, which may 
not correspond to the health needs of the population at stake. Therefore, price control should 
be supplemented by other policies promoting the rational use of medicines. For example, it is 
crucial to choose a correct basket of countries to achieve savings and to avoid paying too high 
prices by referencing to high-price countries only.    
To sum up, ERP is an accepted and widely used policy for cost-containment. For "big" 
countries, ERP offers an opportunity for low prices, as companies may nonetheless 
compensate these by high volume sold in large markets. For "small" countries, ERP is an 
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affordable administrative tool for setting prices, without recurrence to more resource intensive 
strategies, such as those based on health-technology assessment. 
 
Graph 2 - Simulated savings due to a price convergence of countries with above EU level 
prices to EU level prices  
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Source: Eurostat (2007, 2011), OECD (2011), Commission services (DG ECFIN). 
Notes: Total expenditure divided by 10; based on price levels from 2005 and pharmaceutical 
expenditure in 2010 or most recent; price level for EL not available; own calculations. 
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Table 5 – Characteristics of external reference pricing 
 
Scope Price level
# of countries 
in basket
Calculation of reference price
Austria Reimb. ExFP 24 Avg. of all countries
Belgium All ExFP 24 Avg. of all countries
Bulgaria POM EXFP 9 3 lowest prices
Cyprus Imported POM and OTC (in private sector) PPP 4 Avg. of the 4 lowest plus 3% to cover
Czech Republic All ExFP 8 Avg. of all countries
Germany Specific reimb. medicines n.a. 15 n.a.
Denmark ERP not applied - - -
Estonia Innovative reimb. ExFP 4 Not defined
Greece All excl. generics ExFP 22 Avg. of the 3 lowest prices
Spain Innovative reimb. ExFP Not defined Not defined
Finland Reimb. PPP 16 Checking of the price level and the range of the prices in EEA countries according to this ranking: 
NL, BE, BG, ES, IE, IS, UK, IT AT, EL, CY, LV, LI, LU, MT, NO, PT, PL, FR, RO, SE, DE, DK, SI, 
SK, CZ, HU, EEFrance Innovative reimb. ExFP 4 Prices “similar” to those in the reference countries (DE, ES, IT, UK)
Hungary Reimb. PPP 14 Lowest price per basket
Ireland POM incl. generics PPP 9 Avg. of all countries
Italy Reimb. ExFP Not defined Avg. of all countries
Lithuania POM incl. generics ExFP 6 Declared manufacturer price is compared with 95% of the average manufacturer prices in reference 
countries
Latvia Reimb. ExFP 2 Third lowest price and not higher than the price in LT + EE
Luxembourg All PRP 1 Lowest price per basket
Malta n.a. n.a. 12 n.a.
Netherlands POM PRP 4 Avg. of all countries
Poland Reimb. ExFP 17 Lowest price per basket
Portugal POM and reimb. OTC (excl. generics) ExFP, PRP 3 Avg. of all countries
Romania POM ExFP 12 Lowest price per basket
Sweden ERP not applied - - -
Slovenia Reimb. ExFP 3 95% of the average of the 3 countries
Slovakia Reimb. ExFP 26 Avg. of the 6 lowest countries in the basket
United Kingdom ERP not applied - - -  
Sources: Leopold et al. (2012), Commission services (DG ECFIN). 
Notes: In Germany the system has been introduced in 2012. In Belgium, ERP was used as supportive to the pricing decision only. From 2012 on, 
it is used as the main pricing criterion for all patented medicines, which have been at least 5 years on the market. 
Reimb = Reimbursed medicines; POM = Prescription-only medicine(s); OTC = Over-the-counter (products); ExFP = Ex-factory price; PPP = 
Pharmacy purchasing price; PRP = Pharmacy retail price; n.a. = not available.
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Table 6 – Country baskets in external reference pricing  
 
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE EL ES FI FR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK Additional countries
Countries 
in basket
AT 24
BE 24
BG Russia 9
CY 4
CZ 8
DE 15
DK
EE Country of origin 4
EL 22
ES Euro zone countries
FI Iceland and Norway 16
FR 4
HU 1 more 14
IE 9
IT Not specified
LT 6
LU Country of origin 1
LV 2
MT 12
NL 4
PL Switzerland 17
PT 3
RO 12
SE
SI 3
SK 23
UK
Reference 
frequency
11 10 3 5 11 11 8 7 11 14 6 13 11 8 12 10 6 7 3 8 9 11 3 7 8 8 11
 
Sources: Leopold et al. (2012), Commission services (DG ECFIN). 
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5. Health-technology assessment: focusing on the value added of pharmaceuticals 
Health-technology assessment (HTA) assesses the additional value of a medicine relative to 
treatment alternatives. Thus, it gives evidence-based guidance to pricing and reimbursement. 
Up to now, HTA has been primarily used in the EU for coverage and reimbursement 
decisions, though sometimes also for pricing. HTA contributes to evidence-based decisions 
and identifies those pharmaceuticals which offer the highest value for money. HTA is mostly 
used to evaluate pharmaceuticals, although medical devices, clinical procedures and public 
health interventions are increasingly subject to HTA. 
As many pharmaceuticals currently being reimbursed have not undergone any or a proper 
HTA, the overall value added of pharmaceuticals is unknown. Evidence for Germany 
suggests that, in the 1990s, 40% of all prescriptions were on pharmaceuticals with contested 
effectiveness (WIdO 2011). Increasingly, countries limit arbitrary decisions and free pricing 
of pharmaceuticals and use HTA instead. In Germany and the UK, manufacturers will have to 
argue how they choose their prices partly based on the value to patients. Germany had free 
pricing of new medicines and, as shown in section 4, registers some of the highest medicine 
prices in the EU. According to the new rules, if a new treatment has no additional therapeutic 
benefit, reimbursement will be set at a level no greater than the comparable medicine already 
in the market. 
Because of its widely-acknowledged benefits, HTA is used in numerous countries: Belgium, 
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, England, Ireland, Portugal, Norway, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, and Germany. Moreover, its introduction as a systematic 
tool is being prepared in France, Spain, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Slovakia. At the 
European level, EUnetTHA
24
 - a cooperation of European HTA agencies for the promotion of 
HTA - provides a platform for exchange of information and best practices in HTA, 
elaborating internationally accepted standards for HTA.  
HTA consists of an assessment and an appraisal process, during which the assessment results 
are interpreted. Ideally, HTA should address the following main questions (Le Polain et al. 
2011): Is there any medical or societal need for the product? Should the medicine be publicly 
reimbursed and can the public payer afford it? How much more would society be willing to 
pay for it compared to an existing alternative medicine? Should the former alternative 
healthcare interventions (be it pharmaceuticals or devices across all possible clinical 
indications) be excluded from reimbursement, if they are less cost-effective? As such, HTA 
assesses the valued added of the medicine and the budget impact given the public willingness 
to pay and existing alternative pharmaceuticals. 
                                                 
24
 http://www.eunethta.eu/ 
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The decision to pay for a medicine with public money should be transparent, based on 
relevant criteria and the decisions should be revisable (Le Polain et al. 2011). Transparency 
means that all decision criteria and steps in the assessment of a product and the appraisal of its 
value added are at best objective and verifiable and accessible by the public. This is 
important, because decisions often have to strike a balance between conflicting objectives of 
health systems, such as sustainability of public finances, equity and patients' expectations 
towards quality of care. Payers, providers of health care and patients represent different 
interests and should be part of the decision process and be informed on the criteria on which 
decisions are taken. 
The assessment process is detailed out in Table 7 for some countries. HTA is done by review 
agencies, which may be or not closely related to the government.
25
  They may give 
recommendations for coverage and/or pricing decisions for a selected group of or all new 
pharmaceuticals. Assessment is based on evidence provided either exclusively by the 
manufacturer and can be complemented by literature reviews and own analyses. Key decision 
criteria are the therapeutic benefit, cost-effectiveness, the availability of alternatives and 
budget impact of the assessed medicine. 
However, whilst many countries define explicit objective assessment criteria, in practice, the 
decision-making process is often not transparent and could be substantially improved (Le 
Polain et al. 2011). The roles of different stakeholders are often not explicitly defined. There 
is often no explicit framework specifying the criteria, the valuation of choices and decisions 
of the assessment and appraisal process. This is a serious draw-back for the value of HTA. 
Moreover, the lack of a reimbursement threshold weakens the relevance of HTA for decision 
making. The decision makers cannot objectively know against which scale the cost-
effectiveness of a medicine can be measured. As a consequence, any medicine may be 
reimbursed, which inhibits the transparency of decision-making. As an exception, in the UK 
the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) defines a quantitative 
threshold (£20,000-30,000). The threshold reflects the willingness to pay for an additional 
quality adjusted life-year (QALY). Above the threshold, pharmaceuticals are in general not 
reimbursed.
26
 
Reimbursement decisions for pharmaceuticals should be revised regularly. This is because the 
assessed cost-effectiveness involves a substantial amount of uncertainty. Similarly, the budget 
impact may be different than thought. Also, a new, more cost-effective medicine may become 
available. In these cases, systematic revisions ensure that the prior decision to spend public 
money for a medicine may be re-evaluated based on new evidence. Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden do have – among others – revisions of reimbursement 
decisions. However, these are not done systematically. Also, they most often lead to changes 
                                                 
25
 For more cross-country information on this issue see also: http://www.ispor.org/PEguidelines/COMP1.asp 
26
 For end of life pharmaceuticals, this threshold is not used. Also, there are exceptions due to specific societal 
considerations and other countries may use implicit thresholds. 
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in reimbursement decisions rather than a delisting of the medicine from public 
reimbursement.  
Starting in 2014, the UK will launch an obligatory value-based pricing for new medicines, 
possibly extending to all medicines in the long-term. That system will replace the 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) possibly after 2014. NICE will continue to 
evaluate treatments as at present. In negotiations with companies, the UK will make price 
decisions on new pharmaceuticals based on treatment value, innovation, societal impact, and 
unmet needs. The regulators can also change prices at a later stage based on real-world 
evidence including patient-reported outcomes. Overall, however, there is a risk that cost-
ineffective pharmaceuticals remain reimbursable, generating expenditures with no or little 
value added for the treated patients. 
A largely ignored problem is that there exists almost no evidence on how more than two 
pharmaceuticals interact when consumed at the same time. Particularly, older patients have 
multiple co-morbidities and receive co-medication on several pharmaceuticals. There is a risk 
that the benefits of taking only one medicine are reversed and turned into a health risk when 
taken together with other pharmaceuticals. This calls for more research in this area, but also 
for a necessary monitoring and possible blocking of prescription and reimbursement of 
systemic co-medication.  
As a conclusion, HTA is a well-tested tool that can be of great help in closing the current gap 
in publicly available, credible, up-to-date, and scientifically based comparative information on 
the effectiveness of pharmaceuticals and other health interventions. This information can be 
used to base coverage and pricing decisions on evidence of value, thereby facilitating access 
to and public and private investment in the most valued new pharmaceuticals and 
technologies (Sorenson 2010). It can be used for cost-containment by excluding those 
pharmaceuticals from reimbursement which offer no or insufficient value for money.  
HTA may also create a better link between coverage and pricing decisions, as the value added 
of a medicine is assessed for specific groups of patients targeted by the product. The move to 
HTA should also reduce the impact of medicine marketing strategies, strengthening the 
rational prescription behavior by physicians. Countries should consider extending HTA from 
new pharmaceuticals to already introduced on-patent pharmaceuticals and should revise 
reimbursement decisions systematically in the light of new evidence. HTA will help shifting 
from supply to demand driven reimbursement systems, by specifying the willingness to pay 
and taking into account the national ability to pay. As an alternative to internal HTA, which 
can be costly, small countries could make systematic use of HTA carried out by other 
countries with developed capacity.  
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Table 7 – Characteristics of health-technology assessment in some EU Member States 
Therapeutic 
benefit
Cost-
effectiveness
Alternatives
Budget 
impact
Belgium
National Institute for Health and 
Disability Insurance (INAMI-RIZIV)
Coverage
Selected drugs based on 
health impact, disease 
burden, policy relevance
Reviews, analyses and 
manufacturer
Y Y Y Y
Denmark
Reimbursement Committee of the 
Danish Medicines Agency (DKMA)
Coverage Every new drug Manufacturer Y * N N
England
National Institute of Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE)
Coverage and 
pricing**
Selected drugs based on 
health impact, disease 
burden, policy relevance
Reviews, analyses and 
manufacturer
Y Y Y Y
France
Evaluation Committee for Medical 
Products of the National Health Authority 
(HAS) and Economic Committee for 
Health Products (CEPS)
Coverage and 
pricing
Every new drug Manufacturer Y * N Y
Germany
Institute for Quality and Efficiency in 
Health Care (IQWiG)
Coverage
Selected drugs based on 
health/cost impact, drugs 
with inconclusive evidence
Reviews, analyses and 
manufacturer
Y Y Y N
Netherlands
Health Care Insurance Board, 
Committee for Pharmaceutical Aid 
(CHF)
Coverage and 
pricing
Drugs not classifiable under 
reference pricing system
Manufacturer Y Y Y Y
Sweden
Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Board (TLV)
Coverage and 
pricing
Every new drug
Reviews, analyses and 
manufacturer
Y Y Y N
Scope Evidence sources
Key decision criteria
Review body Function
 
Sources: Sorenson (2010), Commission services (DG ECFIN). 
Note:  *Not clear when cost-effectiveness is applied. 
 ** Starting in 2014, the UK will launch an obligatory value-based pricing on all medicines.  
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6. Internal reference pricing: defining reimbursement rates 
Internal reference pricing (IRP) typically means determining the maximum price for generics 
and the maximum reimbursement rate for each medicine. At least 20 EU Member States apply 
IRP (Table 8). The rationale of setting maximum prices is to generate or reinforce competition 
in pharmaceutical markets. In general, the maximum price for generics is defined as a 
percentage of the originator's price. A condition for IRP is to have therapeutically 
interchangeable medicines, often generics, available on the market. Interchangeable 
medicines are grouped often by the same active ingredient (ATC-5) or chemical subgroup 
(ATC-4). Within each group a reference price is defined, which can be the lowest price or the 
average of a set of medicines in each group.  
Most countries cluster medicines by ATC-5 level, while others use ATC-4 or ATC-3 or a mix 
of different levels. When no generics are available, groupings may be broader, including 
comparisons of treatments, such as in the Netherlands and Germany. In terms of 
reimbursement, many EU Member States set the maximum reimbursement rate at the price of 
the cheapest medicine per group. Others choose an average group price. 
Table 8 – Overview of internal reference pricing 
Clustering Pricing Updates
Austria - - -
Belgium ATC-5 31% below original Every 6 months
Bulgaria ATC-5 and 4 Lowest price n.a.
Cyprus - - -
Czech Republic ATC-5 and 4 Lowest price Every 6 months
Germany ATC-5 and other 
levels
Combination of prices Minimum once a year
Denmark ATC-5 Lowest price Every two weeks
Estonia ATC-5 Lowest price Quarterly
Greece - - -
Spain ATC-5 Avg. of the lowest 3 prices n.a.
Finland ATC-5 Lowest price plus a flat amount n.a.
France ATC-5 Lowest price n.a.
Hungary ATC-5 and 4 Lowest price Annually
Ireland - - -
Italy ATC5, 4 and 3 Lowest price Monthly
Lithuania ATC-5 Lowest price n.a.
Latvia ATC5, 4 and 3 Lowest price n.a.
Luxembourg - - -
Malta - - -
Netherlands ATC-4 Avg. price or below n.a.
Poland ATC5, 4 and 3 Lowest price n.a.
Portugal ATC-5 Avg. of the lowest 5 prices Quarterly
Romania ATC-5 Lowest price n.a.
Sweden - - -
Slovenia ATC-5 Lowest price Every 6 months
Slovakia ATC5 and 4 Lowest price Quarterly
United Kingdom - - -
Internal reference pricing
 
Sources: GÖG 2010, EGA 2011, Esprin and Rovira (2007), Vrijens et al. (2010), 
Commission services (DG ECFIN). 
Notes: Greece is considering introducing internal reference pricing; n.a. = not available. 
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IRP has several advantages. Firstly, IRP makes patients and physicians more price sensitive, 
especially if patients are well informed about product alternatives. If a patient chooses a 
higher priced medicine within the same reference group, he/she has to pay the difference 
between the actual and the reference price. Secondly, pharmaceutical companies often 
compete by marketing rather than pricing. IRP, instead, forces companies to enter into price 
competition, as they may choose to reduce prices in line with the reference price in order to 
keep or increase their sales.  
As to the impact of internal reference pricing, it has been reported to generate savings for 
third party payers due to an increase in co-payment, price reductions and reduced use of 
pharmaceuticals within the IRP scheme (Aaserud et al. (2006), Espin and Rovira (2007)). IRP 
was found to have a limited impact on access, having increased out-of-pocket expenses and 
generating some supply problems. There is no evidence of adverse health effects or 
disincentives in pharmaceutical innovation.  
Internal reference pricing has nevertheless some limitations in achieving full price 
competition. This is because IRP reduces the prices of pharmaceuticals subject to this policy 
to the level (price cap) imposed by the regulation (Dylst and Simoens 2010, Puig-Junoy 2010) 
but, without other complementary measures, there is no incentive for lowering prices below 
the regulated price-caps. Interestingly, in countries with already a high generic market share, 
generic firms compete on prices (Dylst and Simoens 2011b). In these markets, free pricing 
appears to work better than setting price-caps, as these would possibly lead to less price 
competition. Therefore, any measures increasing the share of generics in pharmaceutical 
consumption improve the conditions for price competition based on IRP but also based on 
free pricing.  
Secondly, IRP may lead to higher ex-factory prices. The reason is that producers anticipate 
that if they reduce prices, the health authorities will drive the reference prices further down. 
Also, within a reference price system, producers prefer to compete via discounts to 
pharmacies (e.g. discounts of 50% and more in the UK, 20-70% in France) rather than 
through lowering list prices. Discounts are, however, to the detriment of the consumer, as 
pharmacies do not transfer these by lowering consumer prices (Puig-Junoy 2010).  
Thirdly, the effectiveness of IRP depends also on the availability of complementary insurance 
schemes. Complementary insurances partly or fully cover the non-reimbursed share of the 
medicines' price and therefore neutralize any incentives for patients to buy the cheaper 
alternative. This may indirectly have adverse effects on cost-saving efforts of third party 
payers, as complementary insurance will lower price competition and also the market 
penetration of cheaper pharmaceuticals.  
Overall, IRP can be considered a useful policy for cost-containment. By reinforcing price 
competition and favouring generic penetration, it generates savings without any reported 
adverse health effects or negative impact on innovation. As such, it may be preferred to free 
pricing schemes, even if it foregoes all potential savings that may be reaped in free pricing 
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markets. IRP should be backed up by other policies increasing generic penetration, as these 
will increase the market share of generics and thus allow for reducing the reference prices 
further. The main disadvantage of reference pricing leading to discounts to pharmacies may 
be straightened by implementing claw-back policies to recover these discounts. As such, third 
party payers and consumers may benefit from those hidden price reductions. Finally, 
reference pricing should be viewed in line of the availability of complementary insurance 
schemes, as these may negatively impact saving efforts of third party payers.  
7. Time to market entry for generics should be shortened 
In all European countries, marketing authorisation is required for all pharmaceutical products. 
Even after having obtained marketing authorisation, all medicines including generic 
medicines need to await the pricing and reimbursement status to enter the market. The current 
Transparency Directive (89/105/EEC) lays down maximum time-limits for pricing and 
reimbursement decisions, which also allows Member States to establish faster decision-
making procedures. Currently, the directive is under revision, aiming at accelerating pricing 
and reimbursement within 120 days for innovative medicines and within only 30 days for 
generic medicinal products, instead of the 180 days today. The possible drawback of speeding 
up the pricing and reimbursement process for innovative medicines is that health-technology 
assessments have to be done faster, which may possibly reduce their scientific rigour and 
weaken subsequent political decision making based on the scientific evidence. 
The time spanning from companies' request for pricing and reimbursement, after having been 
granted marketing authorisation, and the pricing and reimbursement decision varies 
substantially across the EU (Table 9). In Germany and the UK both steps are immediate. 
Denmark, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands, Sweden have waits up to one month. However, 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia have average waiting times of 
over half a year, considerably delaying the entry of generics and thus foregoing potential 
savings.  
Granting pricing status can be sped up. Firstly, pricing and reimbursement could be combined 
in the same process. Countries doing this have on average lower waiting times. Secondly, in 
several EU Member States registration and marketing authorisation decisions for generics 
could be delinked from patents. This would allow Member States to take such decisions 
before a patent expires as is the case in several Member States and in accordance with 
Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001.
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Then, ideally, generics could enter the market immediately after the patent of the originator 
                                                 
27
 Directive 2001/83/EC establishes a complete and harmonised regulatory framework for registration and 
marketing authorisation procedures in respect of medicinal products for human use. The patent status or the 
Summary of Product Characteristics (SPC) status of the reference medicinal product or of an active substance 
contained in the reference medicinal product are not legal requirements to be considered for the submission of an 
application for marketing authorisation of generic medicinal products. 
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medicine has expired. Thirdly, in countries with internal reference pricing, where generics 
prices are linked to an originator reference product, pricing can also be automatic and 
immediate (European Commission, 2009).  
Table 9 – Time span for price and reimbursement approval for generic medicines after 
marketing authorisation 
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Average number of days 
until price approval
150 30 90 150-240 0 14 90 30 30 60 45 30 90 30 30 30 180 21 90 15 120 5-30 0 62       
Average number of days 
until reimbursement 
approval
150 180 30 150-500 0 14 90 30 30 60 45 30 90 180 180 30 180 120 180 180 150 5-30 0 103     
Applications for pricing 
and reimbursement are 
separate
No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes No Yes No No
Yes: 7; 
No:16
Average days until price 
and reimbursement 
approval
150 210 120 150-500 0 14 90 60 30 60 45 30 90 210 180 30 180 141 270 180 270 5-30 0 122     
Is granting of price 
allowed during patent 
period?
No Yes No No No na na No Yes Yes na No Yes No na na Yes Yes na na na Yes na
Yes: 7; 
No:7; 
na: 9
Is granting of 
reimbursement allowed 
during patent period?
Yes Yes No No No na na No Yes Yes na No Yes No na No Yes Yes na na na Yes na
Yes: 8; 
No:7; 
na: 8  
Sources: EGA (2009), EGA (2011), Commission services (DG ECFIN). 
Notes: No information was available for Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania and Malta. 
The European Commission (2009) has documented that for a sample of medicines analysed in 
its report, 20% additional savings due to generic entry could have been realised, if entry of 
these generics had taken place immediately after the expiry of the patent periods. These could 
have added up to € 3 billion savings on top of the € 15 billion savings through the observed 
generic entry. In order to speed up market entry, the European Commission (2009) has 
recommended giving immediate pricing and reimbursement status to generic medicines in a 
reference pricing system. 
Another significant concern behind delayed market entry of generics is patent linkage, which 
has extensively been analysed by the European Commission (2009). The originator industry 
effectively creates barriers to entry to generic medicines, by multiple patent applications for 
the same molecule and increased patent litigation. These practices lead to extensive delays to 
market entry of generics and to foregone savings of the public payers. As a remedy, the 
establishment of a Community patent and a unified specialised patent litigation system in 
Europe should be undertaken. 
8. Positive/negative lists: cost-saving mechanism if properly designed  
All EU Member States use reimbursement lists (Table 12). Most Member States have positive 
lists specifying which pharmaceuticals are reimbursed. A few countries also have negative 
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lists excluding specific medicines from reimbursement. In most EU Member States 
reimbursement lists are linked to co-payment regulations (Table 16).  
The impact of reimbursement lists on cost-saving appears straightforward: reducing the 
number of medicines on the positive list (i.e. the number of medicines that are reimbursed) 
reduces public expenditure. Nevertheless, including medicines in a negative list, i.e. excluding 
them from public reimbursement, may have uncertain effects on cost-saving if not properly 
designed. If a medicine on a negative list has substitutes in the positive list, expenditures may 
increase if substitutes are more expensive. This happened in Spain, when the average price of 
prescribed pharmaceuticals increased after the exclusion of some previously publicly 
reimbursed medicines (Puig-Junoy 2007). In general, negative lists reduce the number of 
prescribed medicines, but there is a risk of a shift towards more expensive prescriptions, 
which may nullify cost-saving effects. 
The cost-saving effect of positive lists largely depends on the choice of reimbursement 
criteria. Inclusion of pharmaceuticals on a positive list should be based on cost-effectiveness 
criteria as one key criterion, i.e. after having assessed their value added via health-technology 
assessment (see section 5). Also, positive lists should undergo systematic and regular up-
dates, as new pharmaceuticals may make delisting and re-pricing of existing alternatives 
necessary. 
9. Discounts/rebates, payback and clawback policies: controlling excess spending 
There are different mechanisms requiring manufacturers and pharmacists to return a part of 
their revenue to third party payers: 
 Payback policies require manufacturers to pay back a share of their revenue, if a pre-
specified budget ceiling for public pharmaceutical expenditures is exceeded. 
 Discounts and rebates are imposed on manufacturers, wholesalers and pharmacists, 
such that they have to return a part of their revenue. The rebate does not have to be 
linked to a specified target budget as in the case of payback policies. It is often seen as 
an alternative to decreasing list-prices, which has implications in ERP applying 
countries. 
 Clawback policies are usually applied to pharmacies. Clawbacks capture discounts on 
either the dispensing fees of pharmacies or discounts on medicine purchases by 
pharmacies. The rationale of clawback mechanisms is to seize these discounts, which 
increase pharmacies' profit, and to pass them on as income/revenues to the public 
payer.
28
 
                                                 
28
 Note that sometimes the term clawback is used instead of payback.  
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The common element of all these mechanisms is to share the financial risk of a budget 
overshooting between all stakeholders (manufacturers/wholesalers or pharmacists and 
payers). These mechanisms rest on the assumption that the industry, wholesalers and 
pharmacists steer the volume and can be held responsible for volume increases.  
These measures are widespread. Table 12 shows which countries have used discounts and 
payback policies in the past. In France, the industry pays annual rebates to the French health 
insurance funds. In Germany, the government increased in 2010 the rebate on total turnover 
from manufacturers from 6 to 16%. The savings from the rebate have increased from € 600 
million in 2005 to 1,5 billion in 2010 and are projected to increase to € 2 billion in 2011 (BPI 
2011). In the Netherlands, pharmacists are clawed-back around 6.8% of their turnover. 
Recently, Spain has introduced a 7.5% discount on patented and 4% on orphan medicines. 
Similarly, a discount of 6% on reimbursed medicines has been imposed in Portugal in 2010. 
There is no systematic review of discount/rebate and clawback policies for EU Member 
States. In the following, a more detailed account of payback mechanisms is given, as these 
have become more widely used recently.  
In Europe, at least eight countries have introduced payback policies (Table 10). These are 
most often based on an annually approved global target-budget. Manufacturers pay a part of 
the overall excess consumption based on their individual market shares and/or growth rates 
without a ceiling defining the maximum payback. There are sometimes exemptions for 
generic and innovative medicines. 
Payback policies are a powerful tool for public authorities to prevent budget overshooting. 
Payback also increases the predictability of the level of public pharmaceutical expenditures. 
Moreover, it is an alternative to price reductions of pharmaceutical products and is therefore 
often preferred by the industry (given negative spill over effects on other markets through the 
ERP mechanisms). In contrast to price reductions, payback does not aggravate the problem of 
parallel trade, as listed prices are unchanged. Furthermore, it is technically relatively easy to 
implement, provided that there is a well-functioning IT-system registering all sales of 
reimbursed medicines.  
Payback policies have some downsides. Firstly, if the budget is set too high with respect to 
actual health care needs, then the over-consumption of pharmaceuticals is incentivised. If the 
target budget is set too low, then the industry is penalised by payback for serving actual health 
care needs of the population, which might necessitate spending over the target budget. 
Secondly, payback may lower incentives for structural reforms of the health care sector, as it 
in theory guarantees that all excess consumption as defined by the target budget is paid back. 
Thirdly, payback reduces the transparency in effective prices of pharmaceuticals, as payback 
is changing the effective prices but not the listed prices, thereby reducing the effectiveness of 
external reference pricing (see section 4). Fourth, payback may discourage introducing new 
pharmaceuticals, if budget overshooting is an issue and the expected turnover on the new 
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pharmaceuticals has to be paid back. However, a payback agreement and the setting of an 
expenditure target may be conducive to government and industry working towards ensuring 
reduction of unnecessary consumption. It may encourage the implementation of a set of 
measures such as those describe in this paper that ensure a more rational use of medicines. 
Several countries, such as Germany, France, Italy and Portugal, have reported savings due to 
payback policies (Espin and Rovira 2007). However, so far there is no formal assessment of 
the overall impact of payback policies on expenditure, i.e. including a shift in expenditure to 
pharmaceuticals exempted from payback. Similarly, there is little evidence available on the 
long-term effect of claw-back and discount policies, which do not define an expenditure 
ceiling. Whilst in short-term considerable savings are achievable, as in Germany, these 
policies have been found in some cases to be counter-balanced by volume increases (see 
section 17), annihilating any savings potential. 
Overall, rebates, clawback and payback policies are widely used and powerful policy tools for 
cost-containment. Especially in countries where growth rates in pharmaceutical expenditures 
are high and more difficult to predict, or where price reductions are difficult to obtain, they 
are practical tools for generating savings. In case of payback, they also significantly increase 
the predictability in public pharmaceutical spending. However, these policies should be 
aligned with existing or additional incentives for rational use of medicines aimed at the 
distributors of medicines and physicians, as these are also decisive for steering the volume of 
pharmaceuticals sold. 
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Table 10 –Characteristics of payback/clawback policies  
Modalities Belgium Latvia Hungary France Portugal Romania Greece Poland Italy 
Scope 
Global target-
budget 
Global target-
budget 
Global target-
budget 
Global target-
budget and growth 
rate 
Global 
target-budget 
Global 
target-budget 
Global 
target-
budget 
No 
specifics, 
as only 
recently 
legislated 
Global target-
budget 
Tax base 
Annual 
approved 
budget  
Annual 
approved 
budget  
Annual 
approved 
budget  
A predetermined 
turnover rate is set 
for each producer. 
Annual 
approved 
budget  
Annual 
approved 
budget  
Annual 
approved 
budget  
n.a. n.a. 
Tax rate 
Industry pays 
only part of 
the 
consumption 
excess. 
Industry pays 
only part of 
the 
consumption 
excess. 
Industry pays 
100% excess 
consumption 
when budget 
exceeded by 
10%. 
3 thresholds 
ranging from 50 to 
70% payback 
growing with 
excess consumption 
Around 70% 
payback 
above 
budget 
allocation 
100% 
payback 
above budget 
allocation  
100% 
payback 
above 
budget 
allocation  
n.a. 
Industry pays 
40% excess 
consumption 
Differentiated 
tax rate 
n.a. Market share Market share 
A predetermined 
turnover rate is set 
for each producer 
(market share and 
growth) 
Market share 
and growth 
Market share  
Market 
share 
n.a. 
Market share 
and growth 
Payback 
period 
n.a. Quarterly n.a. n.a. Annually Quarterly Bi-monthly n.a. n.a. 
Ceiling value No 
Company 
payback limit 
of LVL 
1.000.000 
n.a. No No No No n.a. n.a. 
Exemptions 
Generics 
exempted.  
n.a. No 
Innovations, 
generics, orphan 
pharmaceuticals 
No No No n.a. n.a. 
Sources: Espin and Rovira 2007, Commission services (DG ECFIN). 
Notes: n.a. = not available
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10. Risk-sharing arrangements: speeding up access to pharmaceuticals and sharing 
financial risks 
Risk-sharing agreements
29
 are agreements between payers (health insurance and social 
security funds) and pharmaceutical companies to diminish the impact on the public budget for 
mainly new, but also existing, pharmaceuticals brought about by uncertainty on the budgetary 
impact or limited budgets.
30
 The rationale of these agreements is to speed up access of 
patients to pharmaceuticals, whilst ensuring that financial risks are shared based on an 
estimated or actual cost-effectiveness and the budget impact of the medicine. Their need is 
accentuated by the fast growing share in pharmaceutical costs of some treatments (e.g. cancer 
products) and the increasing concern over a relatively low level of health gain of new 
pharmaceuticals as compared to standard pharmaceuticals. 
There are various risk-sharing schemes: 
 Price-volume agreements are financial-based schemes which trigger refunds from the 
manufactures if pre-agreed sales / volumes are exceeded. Refunds may be in form of 
lowering reimbursed prices. Payback policies are also a form of price-volume 
agreements, mostly on the level of total pharmaceutical spending (see section 9).  
 Under patient access schemes pharmaceuticals are granted for free or at a lower price 
for a limited time period, so as to improve funding. They may also set an expenditure 
cap for a specific medicine at patient level, granting free treatment once the cap is 
reached.  
 Performance based models trigger refunds if a pre-agreed performance level, e.g. a 
desired health gain, is not reached.  
Risk-sharing agreements diminish the risk of budget overshooting for the public payer. They 
are particularly useful to limit the use of pharmaceuticals to those segments of populations 
where they generate the highest benefits. Similarly, they may be used to control off-label 
prescriptions, i.e. prescriptions of pharmaceuticals for unapproved indications or unapproved 
segments of population. Price-volume agreements are well established and their implications 
are well understood. In what concerns patient access schemes and performance based models, 
their use should probably be restricted to pharmaceuticals linked to health priority diseases, 
where there is a likely health gain within a limited time frame, where no effective and low 
cost standard already exists, and where the administrative burden is manageable. In particular, 
by granting access to innovative pharmaceuticals without having assured their benefits may 
run the high risk that the medicine is prescribed to broader patient populations where the 
                                                 
29
 These are also known as “access with evidence development schemes”, “innovative pricing schemes”, “patient 
access schemes”, “coverage with evidence”, “managed entry agreements” (Espin, Rovira et al. 2011). 
30
 This section widely borrows from Adamski et al. (2010). 
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medicine is not effective. It may be then politically difficult at later stage to delist the 
medicine from public reimbursement. 
No systematic assessment of risk-sharing arrangements is available up-to-date (Espin, Rovira 
et al. 2011). This is because, except for payback policies as a form of price-volume 
agreements, many risk-sharing arrangements are rather recent and their design is "medicine 
dependent". As innovative policy tools, which limit the impact on public spending especially 
for innovative pharmaceuticals with uncertain benefit, they are an interesting way forward in 
terms of cost-containment of pharmaceutical expenditures. 
11. Price freezes and cuts: widely used for immediate savings  
Price freezes and cuts of listed prices are negotiated or set unilaterally by public authorities. 
They may be used as a complement or alternative to rebates, payback, clawback and other 
risk-sharing arrangements, as described above. In contrast to the former, price cuts are applied 
on listed prices. This has further implications on price evolution in other countries through 
external reference pricing. 
Price freezes and cuts are widely used. In 2010 and beginning of 2011 only, they have been 
applied in at least 10 EU Member States (see section 17). The medium- and long-term impact 
of these policies on cost-containment is not clear-cut, as over time they are often 
counterbalanced by volume increases (see section 17). However, they are practical policy 
tools, leading to short-term savings, especially in times of tight public budgets. 
12. Public tendering: increasingly applied in the outpatient sector  
Eighteen EU Member States used public tendering for purchasing pharmaceuticals in 2009 
(Table 11). It is mostly used in hospital settings, although an increasing tendency to use it in 
ambulatory care can be observed. In hospital care, public tendering can cover up to 25% of all 
purchased medicines in some countries, whilst it is much less relevant in ambulatory care 
(Leopold et al. 2008, Kanavos et al. 2009). Medicines purchased through tendering 
procedures are vaccines, pharmaceuticals in pandemic plans, but also branded 
pharmaceuticals and generics prescribed against non-communicable diseases. Price is the 
most important criterion for winning a tender. Other criteria include the availability of the 
medicine.  
In the Netherlands, the bidding company with the lowest price gets exclusive contracts for a 
period of three or six months with the insurance who issued the tender (Preference Policy). 
The average price concessions of the winning companies in 2008 were 85% of the retail price 
before tendering, generating savings of € 355 million or 1/3 of their market value (Kanavos et 
al. 2009). In Germany, tendering works as an invitation for manufacturers to reduce the list 
prices by providing a discount on the price (Rebate Policy). 98% of all tenders in 2008 were 
for generic products and only 2% for patented pharmaceuticals. In 2010, it has been estimated 
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that up to € 1.3 billion could have been recuperated through tendering, an equivalent of 4.3% 
of expenditure (WIdO 2011). 
Tendering systems for outpatient pharmaceuticals have achieved considerable reductions of 
prices. Cost-containment increases with purchasing power of third party payers and 
competition among interchangeable products. If generics are available, bidding may reduce 
payments to the level of marginal production costs (OECD 2008, Dylst et al. 2011a).  
So far, the long-term impact of tendering is unclear. Firstly, it remains to be seen, if the low 
prices achieved through tendering can be sustained over time. Tendering, especially in the 
form of "preference policy" may force some producers out of the market, creating dominant 
positions for a few companies. This may erode competition and future price increases may 
even be the unintended consequence. Until now, however, tendering in the Netherlands and 
Germany did not have these unintended consequences. 
A substantial benefit of tendering is that it increases the transparency of prices. Tendering 
shifts the balance of power to insurers, who can recuperate price discounts normally granted 
to the distributors. Those discounts become directly observable through tendering. This is 
important, as most EU Member States use external price referencing, which induces discounts 
between manufacturers and distributors instead of discounts between manufacturers and 
insurers (see section 4).  
Overall, tendering is a well-established and successful tool for purchasing pharmaceuticals in 
hospital settings and more and more in ambulatory care, having a substantial cost-containment 
potential. A possibility to be explored in future, notwithstanding possible legal considerations, 
is whether tendering could be made international. In this case insurers from a group of 
countries could set up a tender and possibly reap even greater benefits in terms of reduced 
prices. 
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Table 11 – Characteristics of public tendering  
Tendering 
in place
Applied to Pharmaceuticals procured Criteria
Austria Y Hospital care Vaccines, pharmaceuticals as defined in pandemic plans; Best price/offer
Belgium Y Hospital and ambulatory care
Hospital care: Vaccines, pharmaceuticals as defined in pandemic 
plans and specific therapeutic groups of pharmaceuticals;
na
Bulgaria na na na na
Cyprus Y Hospital and ambulatory care na na
Czech Republic Y Hospital and ambulatory care
Hospital care: Vaccines, pharmaceuticals as defined in pandemic 
plans; pharmaceuticals relevant for public hygiene in competence 
of MoH
na
Germany Y Ambulatory care Mostly generics (also biosimilars), some branded
Lowest price, 
product portfolio, 
supply
Denmark Y Hospital care
Vaccines, pharmaceuticals against communicable diseases, 
pandemics
na
Estonia Y Hospital and ambulatory care
Hospital care: Vaccines, pharmaceuticals against communicable 
diseases and drug addiction disorders
na
Greece Y Hospital care na na
Spain na na na
Finland Y Hospital care na
Price, quality, 
supply
France Y Hospital care na na
Hungary Y Hospital and ambulatory care
Hospital care: Vaccines, pharmaceuticals against communicable 
disea ses, pandemics
Lowest price, 
supply
Ireland Y Hospital and ambulatory care
Hospital care: Vaccines, pharmaceuticals against communicable 
diseases, pandemics
Most 
Economically 
Advantageous 
Tender
Italy na na na na
Lithuania na na na na
Latvia Y Hospital and ambulatory care
Hospital care: Vaccines, pharmaceuticals against communicable 
diseases, pandemics and oncology drugs
Lowest price
Luxembourg na na na na
Malta Y Hospital and ambulatory care na na
Netherlands Y Ambulatory care Many molecules Lowest price
Poland na na na na
Portugal Y Hospital and ambulatory care na na
Romania Y Hospital and ambulatory care
Hospital care: Vaccines and pharmaceuticals as defined in 
pandemic plans
Lowest price
Sweden Y Hospital care na na
Slovenia Y Hospital and ambulatory care na na
Slovakia na na na na
United Kingdom Y Hospital care
Vaccines, pharmaceuticals against communicable diseases, 
pandemics
Most 
Economically 
Advantageous 
Tender  
Sources: Leopold et al. 2008, Kanavos et al. (2009), Commission services (DG ECFIN). 
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Table 12 – HTA, positive/negative lists, expenditure controls 
 
Discounts/ 
rebates
Payback
Price-volume 
agreements
Price freezes 
and cuts
Austria Positive Y
Belgium Y Positive Y Y Y
Bulgaria Positive
Cyprus Positive
Czech Republic Y Positive
Germany Y Negative Y Y Y
Denmark Y Positive Y
Estonia Y Positive Y
Greece Positive, negative Y Y Y
Spain Y Negative Y Y
Finland Y Positive Y
France Y Positive Y Y Y Y
Hungary Y Positive, negative Y Y Y Y
Ireland Y Positive Y Y
Italy Positive Y Y Y Y
Lithuania Y Positive Y
Latvia Y Positive Y
Luxembourg Positive
Malta Positive
Netherlands Y Positive Y
Poland Y Positive
Portugal Y Y Y Y Y
Romania Positive Y Y Y
Sweden Y Positive Y
Slovenia Positive Y
Slovakia Y Positive Y
United Kingdom Y Negative Y Y Y
Health-
technology 
assessment
Positive/negativ
e lists
Expenditure controls
 
Sources: GÖG 2010, EGA 2011, Esprin and Rovira (2007), Commission services (DG ECFIN).
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13. Physicians: improving prescription performance 
In most EU Member States, physicians have the exclusive right to prescribe medicines.
31
 
Therefore, they play a crucial role in determining whether medicines are consumed rationally 
or not. As medical experts, physicians evaluate the health needs of their patients and assess 
the pros and cons of specific treatments. Acting in the interest of patients' health is clearly a 
key ethical imperative for physicians. However, in reality, physicians face different pressures 
and contrasting "incentives", such as earning an income, being up-to-date with innovations in 
medical treatment, keeping allocated budgets (if this applies), staying objective in the choice 
of treatment despite pressure from third party payers, the industry or the patients. As a result, 
prescriptions may sometimes be sub-optimal, in the sense of being unnecessary or costly, 
despite the availability of lower-cost alternatives. 
There are a number of measures to improve physicians' prescription behaviour (Table 13): 
prescription monitoring, prescription guidelines including requirements for prescribing by the 
international non-proprietary name (INN), targets for prescription costs, prescription quotas, 
financial incentives, educational and information tools. 
In at least 22 EU Member States physicians' prescription patterns are monitored. Third party 
payers may monitor individual physicians' prescriptions and benchmark these with 
prescriptions of their colleagues with same specialty in a given region or country. Ideally, 
each prescription is sent electronically to third party payers. Physicians may get feedback on 
their performance relative to the benchmark, and may be visited by representatives of third 
party payers. In case of large divergences from the benchmark, physicians may be asked to 
explain these. In case of unexplained deviations, physician may be required to pay fines, 
undergo legal action or see their prescription rights waived. 
At least 24 EU Member States have prescription guidelines. Guidelines may consist of 
clinical prescription protocols based on evidence and may include financial considerations. In 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hungary and Slovakia these are compulsory (in Greece they 
have just been legislated), whilst they are indicative in the remaining countries.  
Prescription by international-non-proprietary-name (INN), i.e. by the active ingredient instead 
of the brand name, is a key tool for improving prescription behaviour. The rationale of 
prescribing by INN is to promote the use of the cheapest medicine with same active 
ingredient, so as to generate savings for both third party payers and patients without impacting 
adversely on patients' health status. INN is mandatory in five, indicative in eighteen and 
disallowed in four EU Member States. One promising way of promoting INN is to install an 
electronic prescribing system in which the brand name on a prescription is automatically 
changed into the generic name, such as in the Netherlands (Zuidberg 2010). 
                                                 
31
 Increasingly, nurses and midwives have the limited right of prescribing medicinal products, see e.g. 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/11/127. 
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Setting budget targets for each physician is another tool for rationalizing prescription 
behaviour. At least 10 EU Member States use this policy tool to a varying degree. Targets 
may be informative or may trigger financial benefits in case of overperformance (e.g. France) 
and/or sanctions in case of underperformance (e.g. Czech Republic, Germany).  
Doctors may also be required to fulfil prescription quotas within their total budget, i.e. to 
prescribe a certain share of cheap, usually generic, pharmaceuticals. This is the case in six EU 
Member States. Finally, physicians may be targeted by education and information tools, 
which is the case in most EU Member States. For instance, they may be informed about 
prescription guidelines and may be required to participate in continuous on-the-job education. 
Prescription patterns may be published, so as to educate physicians on regular prescription 
behaviour. 
Prescription behaviour may also be improved, when the (family) doctor is aware of all the 
pharmaceuticals a patient is taking, by using medicine interaction tools. These provide 
information on whether the effect of a particular medicine is altered when taken with another 
medicine or with specific food. This may reduce the risk of wrong co-medication. It may also 
be used to block the prescription and reimbursement of "excessive" systemic co-medication, 
as virtually nothing is known about its impact on the health status of the patient.  
It is difficult to evaluate the impact of all tools for improving prescription behaviour on cost-
containment due to their quantity and variety in actual implementation. Up-to-date, no global 
formal assessment of these policies exists (Espin and Rovira 2007). Literature suggests that, 
in general, a mix of interventions, such as monitoring including feedback systems combined 
with group or one-to-one educational interventions, have a positive impact, whereas focusing 
on information dissemination alone is not effective (Gill et al 1999, Soumerai et al. 1989, 
Gray 2006). IT rule-based prescription systems can contribute to improve the quality of 
prescriptions and to lower prescription costs (Anton et al 2004, McMullin et al 2004). Chaix-
Couturier et al. (2000) and Ashworth et al. (2004) report that financial (dis-)incentives have a 
cost-containing effect on the use of pharmaceuticals, and that they improve the compliance 
with clinical guidelines. 
To sum up, tools for improving prescribing behaviour are widely used in the EU and may be 
regarded as standard policies aiming at the rational use of medicines. Combining different 
measures, such as electronic prescription monitoring and guidelines linked with electronic 
systems, which support decision making and give feedback to the physician, appears an 
effective way of improving prescription behaviour. In addition, education and information 
tools should be enhanced where possible. INN prescription and prescription quotas, possibly 
coupled with target budgets and financial incentives appear to be effective tools for cost-
containment purposes. 
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Table 13 – Policies targeted at physicians 
Austria Y Obligatory - Y Y
Belgium Y Obligatory Indicative Y Y Y
Bulgaria N. a. Indicative Indicative Y
Cyprus - Indicative
Czech Republic Y Indicative Indicative Y Sanctions Y
Germany Y Obligatory Indicative Y
Incentives 
and sanctions
Y Y
Denmark Y Indicative - Y
Estonia Y Indicative Obligatory Y
Greece Y Obligatory Obligatory Y
Spain Y Indicative Indicative Y Incentives Y Y
Finland Y Indicative Indicative Y
France Y Indicative Indicative Y Incentives Y
Hungary Y Obligatory Indicative Y Sanctions
Ireland Y - Indicative Y Y
Italy Y Indicative Obligatory Y
Lithuania Y Indicative Obligatory Y
Latvia Y Indicative Indicative Y Sanctions Y
Luxembourg Y Indicative Indicative Y
Malta N. a. - Indicative
Netherlands Y Indicative Indicative Y Y
Poland Indicative Indicative Y
Portugal Y Indicative Obligatory Y Y
Romania Y - Obligatory Y
Sweden Y Indicative - Y Y Y
Slovenia Y Indicative Indicative Y
Slovakia Y Obligatory Indicative Y Y Y
United Kingdom Y Indicative Indicative For NHS Y Y
Financial 
incentives
Education and 
information
Prescription 
quotas
Prescription 
monitoring
INN 
prescribing
Prescription 
guidelines
Target 
budgets
 
Sources: GÖG 2010, EGA 2011, Esprin and Rovira (2007), Commission services (DG 
ECFIN). 
14. Pharmacists: right or obligation to generic substitution 
Generic substitution is a right or an obligation of pharmacists to substitute a cheaper (generic) 
medicine with the same active ingredient(s) for another, usually a brand medicine. It is 
obligatory in seven, indicative in 15 and disallowed in five EU Member States (Table 14). 
The main rationale of generic substitution is to contain pharmaceutical expenditure without 
compromising health objectives.  
Currently, roughly 43% of the volume of pharmaceuticals in the EU is supplied as generics 
medicines, but this is just 18% in value terms. Shares in volume and value vary largely across 
countries: 79% of all pharmaceuticals sold in Latvia are generics, but only 27% in Austria; 
similarly, in terms of value, the shares of generics vary between 12% in Sweden and 40% in 
Poland and Romania (Graph 3).  
In the next four years, up to 40% of currently patent protected pharmaceuticals will be 
available as generic medicines (IMS 2010). This "patent cliff" will open a large segment of 
the market to generics, creating a huge savings potential. In European countries, generics are 
on average three-to-four times cheaper than the respective off-patent originals. In addition, 
generics have been shown to be as good for health as the original pharmaceuticals (Aaserud et 
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al. 2009). Literature suggests that generic substitution leads to lower expenditures, including a 
decrease in the growth rate of pharmaceutical expenditures. It also leads to reduced product 
prices and an increase in the use of cheapest interchangeable medicines (Espin and Rovira 
2007). As such, generic substitution bears a high potential to generate savings. 
The cost-saving potential of generic substitution is high. A detailed recent study estimates the 
net budget impact of savings for the public payer created through products going off-patent 
versus costs created by new entries of medicines in seven EU Member States (UK, DE, FR, 
PL, EL, PT, HU) for the period 2012 to 2016 (European Commission 2012). The cumulative 
net budget impact is € 19 billion: € 30 billion of savings generated through brand medicines 
going off-patent against € 11 billion of costs due to new entries of medicines. This 
corresponds to a roughly 20% reduction in public pharmaceutical spending for these seven 
countries. 
Table 14 – Generic substitution 
  Generic substitution 
  
Generic 
substitution 
Austria Disallowed Italy Indicative 
Belgium Partly obligatory* Lithuania Indicative 
Bulgaria Disallowed Latvia Indicative 
Cyprus 
Obligatory in public 
sector 
Luxembourg Disallowed 
Czech Republic Indicative Malta 
Obligatory in 
public sector 
Germany Obligatory Netherlands Indicative 
Denmark Obligatory Poland Indicative 
Estonia Indicative Portugal Obligatory 
Greece Obligatory Romania Obligatory 
Spain Obligatory Sweden Obligatory 
Finland Obligatory Slovenia Indicative 
France Indicative Slovakia Obligatory 
Hungary Indicative United Kingdom Disallowed 
Ireland Disallowed     
Sources: Vogler, S. (2012), GÖG 2010, Commission services (DG ECFIN). 
Notes: *Obligatory substitution for antibiotics and antimycotics only. 
Based on a simple simulation, using data on  the generic market shares in volume and value 
(Graph 3), and assuming that the market share in volume increases in all countries to 80% - as 
in Latvia -, we calculate that savings in public pharmaceutical expenditure of 33% or an 
equivalent of € 43 billion in the EU are possible (Graph 4).32 Potential savings are of course 
highest for countries with currently lower market shares in volume for generics and with 
higher relative price ratios between originator and generic pharmaceuticals. This back-to-the 
envelope estimate points to as much as 40% or more of current public pharmaceutical 
                                                 
32
 Savings are estimated by exploiting the inherent information on relative prices between originator 
pharmaceuticals and generics, given the data on the market shares of generics in both volume and value. It is 
assumed, that the increase in the market share of generics in volume to 80% does not change the initial relative 
price ratios. 
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expenditure that could be saved in Italy and Spain. Whilst these estimations are based on 
rough assumptions, other studies come to similar conclusions. The EGA have estimated 
savings in the EU of around € 30 billion (EGA 2009). Simoens (2006, 2011a, 2011b) 
estimates savings of up to 48%, if the full potential in generic medicines was realised; up to € 
16 billion savings based on the major disease categories are possible. EGA (2011) estimates 
that nine EU Member States achieved savings in the order of € 26 billion in 2010. 
Potentially, savings may be higher. Firstly, prices of generics differ substantially, both across 
countries and among interchangeable generic pharmaceuticals. This is foremost the case for 
branded versus not-branded generics. If governments chose reimbursing only the cheapest 
medicine for a specific treatment, considerable savings are possible. Secondly, increased 
generic volume may imply an increased price competition among generic alternatives leading 
to lower prices. Thirdly, public tendering has been shown to generate substantial savings, 
which might be exploited to a higher degree, once generic volumes increase (see section 12).  
Graph 3 – Generic market shares in volume and value, 2010 or most recent data. 
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Source: IMS 2010, EGA 2011, 2010 or most recent data, Commission services (DG ECFIN). 
Notes: No information was available for Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and 
Malta. The EU average is thus estimated excluding these countries. Cyprus: public sector 
only. 
Whilst generic substitution has a huge saving potential, sales of on-patent medicines are 
driving increases in expenditures to a considerable extent. Indeed, whilst the volume of 
generics has increased in many European countries, the market share of generics in value has 
remained rather low. Regulated and competitive price decreases of generic medicines have 
partly contributed to the stable share in market value. But also, increases of prices of patented 
medicines contribute to this. Evidence from Germany suggests that the share of generics in 
prescriptions increased from 38 to 71% since 1993 (WIdO 2011). In contrast, the share in 
value has stayed constant. This is driven by both an average 30% increase of prices of on-
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patent medicines and a 30% decrease of prices of off-patent medicines. Consequently, key 
drivers of increases in expenditures seem to be on-patent medicines. Generic substitution will 
accordingly only partially contribute to cost-containment, whilst improving the value for 
money of patented pharmaceuticals will remain an important policy.   
Graph 4 – Potential savings by increasing the volume of generics to 80% of market 
share, in million Euro and % of public pharmaceutical expenditure in 2009 
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Source: IMS (2010), EGA (2011), Commission services (DG ECFIN). 
Notes: In the right graph, expenditure for the EU is divided by 10. Cyprus: public sector only. 
15. Remunerating wholesalers and pharmacists: setting the right incentives 
Most EU Member States have regulated the reimbursement of wholesalers' and pharmacists' 
services for, at least, reimbursable medicines, mostly by means of regressive, but sometimes 
also linear mark-ups and profit margins (Kanavos et al. 2011a). Only in Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK, wholesale mark-ups are unregulated.
33
 Sometimes, 
countries use dispensing fees or a mix of regressive/linear margins and dispensing fees for 
                                                 
33
 Instead the pharmacy purchasing price is controlled and the ex-factory price is negotiated between producers 
and wholesalers. 
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pharmacies. In Slovenia and the UK, pharmacists are paid on a fee-for-service basis. Based on 
a sample of 22 EU Member States, the average margins for wholesalers range between 2.5 
(Sweden) and 18% (The Netherlands) of the pharmacy purchasing price, with most countries 
range between 3 and 13% (Table 15). According to the information available on pharmacy 
margins of 15 EU Member States, the range is between 17 and 48% of the pharmacy retail 
price (Romania and Luxembourg, respectively), mostly ranging between 18 and 25%.  
The effective margins may differ from the regulated margins due to two factors. On the one 
hand, wholesalers and pharmacists are sometimes granted considerable discounts by 
manufacturers, which increase their effective margins (see section 4). On the other hand, 
public authorities require the distributors to offer discounts to the public payer, effectively 
reducing the distributors' margins (see section 9).  
The impact of the distributors' margins on the final retail price of prescription medicines 
varies strongly between EU Member States (Kanavos et al. 2011a). Margins impact more on 
generic than patented pharmaceuticals and more on less expensive than more expensive 
medicines. Kanavos et al. (2011a) report that in some outlier cases distribution costs and VAT 
make up to 90% of total costs to the payer.  
The remuneration of pharmacies may discriminate against the use of cheaper medicines, e.g. 
if profit margins are regulated as a percentage of the product price. This sets incentives to 
dispense more expensive medicines and is only partly offset by regressive percentage 
margins. Fixed-fees, such as in Belgium, may be a neutral incentive to dispense originator and 
generic pharmaceuticals. In the Netherlands, pharmacies are rewarded to dispense 
pharmaceuticals below the reference price by being able to retain a percentage of the 
difference between the cheaper and the originator pharmaceutical.  
The number of wholesalers and the density of pharmacies across EU Member States vary 
considerably. The number of wholesalers ranges widely between 5 and 160 wholesalers per 
country (low in e.g. Germany and high in Greece) (Table 15). Also, the density of pharmacies 
varies across EU Member States between 0.6 and 8.3 per 10,000 of population (Denmark and 
Greece, respectively), with an unweighted average in the EU of 3.1 pharmacies per 10,000 of 
population. Distribution costs may be lowered by greater consolidation in the number of 
wholesalers and/or pharmacies in some countries. This is especially the case for wholesalers, 
which can benefit from economies of scale. This is partly also true for pharmacies, where the 
trend goes towards the build-up of pharmacy chains. Consolidation in the pharmacy sector 
may imply that physicians get the right of dispensing medicines in remote areas.  
In view of cost-containment, empirical evidence indicates that reducing wholesalers' and 
pharmacists' profit margin, and in particular, doing so in a way that counteracts the incentive 
to sell more expensive medicines, may be a valid tool for reducing pharmaceutical 
expenditures. In fact, this policy is often applied in European countries (see section 17). 
Similarly, reducing the density of pharmacies and the number of wholesalers may generate 
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considerable savings. A further possibility to reduce costs to the payers could be to expand the 
use of direct distribution, in which the wholesalers are bypassed. In addition, a broader 
(controlled) use of "internet pharmacies", which compete on price and may pass on 
considerable discounts to the payers, can be cost-saving. 
 
Table 15 – Number of wholesalers and pharmacies and their average margins 
#pharmacies 
per 10,000 
population
#whole-
salers*
Avg. 
wholesaler 
margin 
(%PPP)**
Avg. 
pharmacy 
margin 
(%PRP)
Type of wholesaler 
markup
Type of pharmacy markup
Austria 1.5 10 10.0% 19.2% Regressive Regressive + dispensing fee 10.0% 20.0%
Belgium 4.8 15 8.5% na Regressive Regressive + dispensing fee 6.0% 21.0%
Bulgaria 5.9 20 8.5% 20% Regressive Regressive 20.0% 20.0%
Cyprus
5.6 na na na
Differs for locally 
manufactured versus 
imported drugs
Linear 5.0% 15.0%
Czech Republic 2.3 30 4.3% na Regressive Regressive 10.0% 20.0%
Germany 2.6 5 5.0% 24% Regressive Linear 19.0% 19.0%
Denmark
0.6 5 6.5% 19.30%
Negotiations with 
manufacturers
 Linear + dispensing fee 25.0% 25.0%
Estonia 2.3 50 na 19% Regressive Regressive 9.0% 20.0%
Greece 8.3 160 4.0% na Regressive Regressive 6.5% 23.0%
Spain 4.5 60 3.5% na Regressive Regressive 4.0% 18.0%
Finland
1.5 5 3.0% 24%
Negotiations with 
manufacturers
Regressive + dispensing fee 9.0% 23.0%
France 3.6 10 6.2% na Regressive Regressive + dispensing fee 2.1%/5.5% 19.6%
Hungary 2.4 10 6.2% 19% Regressive Regressive 5.0% 25.0%
Ireland 3.4 5 na na na  Dispensing fee 0%/21% 21.0%
Italy 2.9 70 3.0% na na Linear 10.0% 20.0%
Lithuania 4.5 na 8.5% na Regressive Regressive 5%/21% 21.0%
Latvia 3.8 na 3.3% 19% Regressive Regressive 12.0% 22.0%
Luxembourg
1.9 5 na 48%
Differs by country of origin 
of the drug
Linear 3.0% 15.0%
Malta
5.3 na 15.0% 20%
Differs for public versus 
private market
Linear 0.0% 18.0%
Netherlands
1.2 10 18.0% na
Negotiations with 
manufacturers
 dispensing fee 6.0% 19.0%
Poland 2.8 na 9.8% na Regressive Regressive 8.0% 23.0%
Portugal 2.6 10 6.9% 18% Regressive Regressive 6.0% 23.0%
Romania 2.3 40 12.0% 17% Regressive Regressive 9%/24% 24.0%
Sweden
1.0 10 2.5% 21%
Negotiations with 
manufacturers
Regressive 0%/25% 25.0%
Slovenia 1.5 10 8.5% 2.10 € Regressive Regressive + dispensing fee 8.5% 20.0%
Slovakia 3.6 10 na 21% Regressive Regressive + dispensing fee 10.0% 20.0%
United Kingdom
2.1 10 12.5% na
Negotiations with 
manufacturers
 Linear + dispensing fee 0%/20% 20.0%
VAT*
 
Sources: Abda (2011), Kanavos et al. (2011a), Commission services (DG ECFIN). 
Notes: na = not available; PPP = pharmacy purchase price; PRP = pharmacy retail price; VAT 
= value-added tax. 
*      Numbers are approximated from graph 3.1 in Kanavos et al. (2011a). 
**    Average, when range of margins was provided by Kanavos et al. (2011a). 
***  Romania and Sweden: lower rate for prescription pharmaceuticals; Lithuania and France: 
lower rates for refundable pharmaceuticals; Ireland: 0% for oral medication; UK: 0% for 
National Health Services pharmaceuticals. 
16. Cost-sharing for patients: increased patient responsibility against possible risk of 
reduced treatment compliance  
Cost-sharing requires patients covered by a health insurer to share the cost of the 
pharmaceutical product acquired. Cost-sharing may be applied as deductibles, co-insurance or 
co-payment. Co-insurance, whereby patients pay a percentage of the price of the medicine, is 
the most commonly used in the case of pharmaceuticals. The rationale for using cost-sharing 
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is to increase the price sensitivity of patients, reduce the unnecessary use of medicines and 
generate income for and reduce expenditure of public payers. It is generally found that the 
demand for health care is price inelastic, i.e. a 1 per cent increase in the price of health care 
will lead to a less than 1 per cent reduction in demand for health care. However, demand 
elasticity increases with increasing levels of cost-sharing, i.e. cost-sharing makes patients 
more price sensitive (Ringel et. al 2005). 
Most EU Member States have cost-sharing rules (Table 16). These may vary by applying 
differentiated reimbursement rates, such as 100% reimbursement for vital, 80% for chronic 
and 60% or lower for other medicines. Also, most often (vulnerable groups of) patients are 
protected from excessive out-of-pocket payments through specific (often means-tested) rules, 
such as reduced cost-sharing rates, exemptions, tax deductibles of cost-sharing or annual co-
payment ceilings. 
Cost-sharing may improve the rational use of medicines, but its effects are uncertain: 
 The overall impact of cost-sharing policies on cost-containment in EU Member States 
has not been assessed. No country has compared the impact of cost-sharing on 
pharmaceutical expenditures against a no cost-sharing alternative (Espin and Rovira 
2007). However, cost-sharing appears to increase the use of cheaper generic 
pharmaceuticals, thus generating savings.  
 Different studies show that patients use less of both essential and non-essential 
pharmaceuticals because of changes in cost-sharing (OECD 2008, Puig-Junoy et al. 
2011, Manning et al. 1988). Decreased use of essential pharmaceuticals may 
negatively impact on health. Cost-sharing may also reduce medication adherence, 
leading to worse health outcomes (Cutler and Everett 2010). 
 Where product alternatives for treating a specific condition exist, cost-sharing are 
often used as a disincentive for consuming cost-ineffective pharmaceuticals. However, 
patients often cannot judge on the benefits of medicines. Delisting is a clearer signal 
for patients as for the benefits of a medicine instead of cost-sharing. 
 Cost-sharing may be perceived as unfair and may excessively tax vulnerable groups. 
Whilst exemptions from cost-sharing are a way of avoiding regressive taxation, these 
have to be well designed. Also because too many exemptions may render the system 
ineffective, whilst imposing an administrative cost on the collection of cost-sharing. In 
2008/2009, 24 out of 29 countries exempted vulnerable groups from cost-sharing 
(according to a range of income or health related, criteria), who are responsible for a 
bulk of pharmaceutical expenditure. This obviously makes cost-sharing less effective 
(Puig-Junoy et al. 2011). 
 Cost-sharing may increase the prices of pharmaceuticals, as it increases the funding 
sources for consumption through additional private resources.  
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Overall, cost-sharing may have an uncertain impact on cost-containment. It must be designed 
to insure against over-consumption, whilst avoiding the underuse of essential medicines 
especially for vulnerable groups. Delisting of particularly (cost-) ineffective medicines may 
be an alternative. For a cost-saving purpose, one could allow for lower cost-sharing for lower 
priced products. This would serve as an additional incentive for patients to buy cheaper 
products and for the industry to reduce product prices. 
Table 16 – Cost-sharing policies 
  Cost-sharing 
  
Cost-sharing 
Austria Fixed Italy Fixed 
Belgium % Lithuania % 
Bulgaria % Latvia % 
Cyprus % (public sector) Luxembourg % 
Czech Republic % Malta No 
Germany % Netherlands Yes 
Denmark Fixed, %, deductible Poland % 
Estonia Fixed, % Portugal % 
Greece % Romania % 
Spain % Sweden %, deductible 
Finland Fixed, % Slovenia % 
France Fixed, % Slovakia Fixed, % 
Hungary Fixed, % United Kingdom Fixed 
Ireland No 
    
Sources: GÖG 2010, EGA 2011, Commission services (DG ECFIN). 
17. Pharmaceutical reforms and their impact 
 
In 2010, 2011 and 2012, 23 European countries underwent or were planning a substantial 
number (estimated to be about 89 by Vogler et al. 2011b) of reforms of pharmaceutical 
policies.  
 
Most often policies included: 
 
 Discounts/rebates and clawback policies: EE, LT, ES, DE, PT, IT; 
 Introduction of payback systems for the industry: PL, RO, PT, EL; 
 Price freezes and cuts: CZ, UK, ES, EL, DE, LT, PT, IE, MT; 
 Changes in the VAT on medicines: LT, CZ, UK, EL, FI, PT, LV, PL;  
 Changes in the external referencing to countries with lower price levels: LT, SW, EE, 
SK, DE;  
 Introducing external referencing as a pricing criterion: BE, DE; 
 Changes in internal reference pricing rules: PT, ES, LT, ES, LV, BE, PL, EL; 
 Planned introduction of internal reference pricing in IE; 
 Broader clustering at ATC-3 level in RO; 
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 Introducing positive and negative lists (EL, RO); 
 Requiring mandatory value assessment for new medicines in DE, EL, RO;  
 Introduction of value-based pricing in 2012 in UK. 
 
Less often measures were aimed at: 
 Decreases in distribution margins: ES, EL, LT, PT, BE, IT, DE, PL, LV; 
 Revising the reimbursement eligibility for all medicines in CZ; 
 Increasing cost-sharing for patients: AT, BE, DK, LV, LT, EL, PT; 
 Introducing or enforcing mandatory INN prescribing: LT, CZ, SK, EL, PT, IT; 
 Obligation to offer least expensive medicines to patients and have them on stock: LT, 
EE, PL, EL, PT; 
 Introduction or reinforcing e-prescribing: EE, LT, PT, EL, RO; 
 Generics promotion campaigns for the public: EE, ES, PT. 
Most of the measures were concentrated in countries which were more strongly affected by 
the economic crisis, such as the Baltic States, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. The measures are 
supposed to lead to short-term savings by directly reducing price levels of pharmaceuticals 
(e.g. through discounts, clawback, payback, price cuts and freezes, changes in external 
reference pricing). Some countries have also undertaken important measures promoting the 
rational use of medicines, such as the introduction and reviews of reimbursement lists, 
mandatory INN prescribing, e-prescription and generics promotion campaigns.  
It is too early to evaluate the impact of these recent policy reforms on cost-containment. 
Empirical research on past experiences is still scarce and sometimes points to mixed results. 
Some measures, such as mandatory generic substitution, regressive pharmacy mark-ups and 
claw-backs do effectively reduce pharmaceutical prices (Schulenburg et al. 2011). There is 
less consistent evidence on other measures. Whereas the use of cost-effectiveness evidence 
reduces prices, evidence on reference pricing is unclear, although originator prices are 
reduced by drops in generic prices after patents expiry.  
Whether a certain policy is successful or not, depends also on whether it is introduced in a 
largely unregulated market or is just partially changing existing regulations. Most of the 
reforms described above took place in countries which already had regulated markets to a 
certain degree, such that the subsequent reforms were only incremental. Sood et al. (2008) 
find – by analysing pharmaceutical regulations in 19 developed countries - that incremental or 
partial reforms have indeed only a minor impact on cost-containment. However, they also find 
that regulating completely or partially unregulated segments of pharmaceutical markets can 
lead to considerable long-term savings.  
Indeed, in the past, incremental or partial reforms have often failed to achieve their targets. A 
recent article shows that in Spain, all of the measures introduced between 1997 and 2006 to 
contain the growth in pharmaceutical expenditure were ineffective in the long term (Moreno-
Torres et al. 2010). These cost-containment measures included revisions of a reference pricing 
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system, reductions of ex-factory prices, mark-up adjustments, prescribing incentives and 
exclusion of pharmaceuticals from reimbursement.  Possible reasons for the failure of these 
measures were that price reductions were counterbalanced by more prescriptions; the dosage 
per prescription was increased; more expensive instead of cheaper pharmaceuticals were 
prescribed; and new medicines for new treatments got on the reimbursement list.  
Similarly, in Germany in 2010, the 16% obligatory price cut on ex-factory prices of on-patent 
pharmaceuticals has in the short term reduced the growth rate in pharmaceutical expenditure. 
Manufacturers and distributors have however already partly counterbalanced the drop in 
income by selling higher-priced pharmaceuticals. 
A study based on Belgian data shows that policy regulations for generic promotion throughout 
1995-2009 (changes in reimbursement conditions, public tendering, and entry of generic 
competitors in reference pricing) did not have any long-term effects (Fraeyman 2011). 
Thus, whilst targeting prices may generate savings in the short term, it appears that in the past 
stakeholders have often been able to counterbalance the drop in price by selling, prescribing 
and dispensing higher volumes and more expensive pharmaceuticals. Also, there may be a 
risk of price cuts jeopardizing the rational use of medicines, if price cuts lead to increased 
volumes of pharmaceuticals reimbursed and consumed. However, the low cost-saving effects 
of some of the past reforms would wrongly lead to the conclusion that reforms are not needed. 
They may, however, point to the already large cost-containing effects in place of given 
regulations, which if discarded, could spur an unprecedented growth in pharmaceutical 
spending. 
All these considerations point to the need for a more comprehensive approach, with a set of 
measures addressing "strategic" behaviour and appropriate incentives of all stakeholders. 
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Box: Pharmaceutical reforms in Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Romania 
This box describes the pharmaceutical policies put in place under the financial assistance 
programmes of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (EC-ECB-IMF) for Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Romania. It briefly 
describes the challenges faced by these countries and the main measures undertaken to ensure 
a more cost-effective and financially sustainable use of pharmaceuticals.
34
 
 
1) Ireland: Cutting costs in public pharmaceutical spending 
In Ireland, authorities reduced the prices of off-patent medicines with a generic equivalent by 
20% in 2007, 15% in 2009 and a further 40% in 2010. As a consequence, prices of generics 
have been realigned. Further, wholesaler margins and pharmacy mark-ups have been cut 
substantially. Some of these measures effectively reduced expenditure on patented, off-patent 
and generic pharmaceuticals. However, the effect on spending may have been rather limited 
(Usher, C. et al 2011). Complementing such price measures with policies that control volume/ 
consumption may be necessary to promote the rational use of pharmaceuticals. These would 
render the price measures more effective.  
 
2) Greece: overhauling the pharmaceutical sector and the introduction of much needed 
reforms 
Prior to the First Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, public expenditure on 
outpatient pharmaceuticals (i.e. not considering hospital expenditure on pharmaceuticals) was 
the highest in the EU and considerably above the EU average (about 1% for 2008 and 1.1% in 
2009). According to the WHO, public expenditure on outpatient pharmaceuticals was about 
1.9% of GDP in 2008 and data from social security funds put public expenditure on outpatient 
pharmaceuticals at about 2.2% of GDP in 2009 (about €5 100 million). Expenditure had 
increased substantially since 1998 (0.8% of GDP) and especially in recent years. Greece also 
appeared to have the highest rate of antibiotic prescriptions in an analysis conducted in 13 
OECD countries in the late 1990s.  
In 2010, and just prior to the Economic Adjustment Programme, authorities revised the price 
list and introduced a 20% cut in prices of pharmaceuticals with only some exceptions. This 
led to a reduction in public expenditure on outpatient pharmaceuticals of 0.4 p.p. of GDP 
(about € 1 200 million savings). Nevertheless, expenditure remained high, at 1.8% of GDP in 
2010.  
                                                 
34
 European Commission publications related to the Economic Adjustment Programmes for Ireland, Greece and 
Portugal and the Balance of Payments Programme for Romania can be accessed here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/index_en.htm. 
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Moreover, contrary to most EU Member States, Greece lacked a coherent set of policies that 
help control and monitor public expenditure on pharmaceuticals and contribute to an effective 
and cost-effective use of pharmaceuticals. Even when some tools were set by law, they lacked 
effective implementation. In this context, reducing expenditure on pharmaceuticals and 
ensuring a cost-effective use of pharmaceuticals was deemed crucial and urgent for both a 
public finances and public health point of view.  
Therefore, a wide range of policy reforms was agreed in the context of the Economic 
Adjustment Programme, aligning Greece with the common tools used by other EU Member 
States to control expenditure in this sector. An initial target of 1% of GDP by end 2012 was 
set for outpatient public spending on pharmaceutical. This corresponded to savings of at least 
€ 3 000 million. This was complemented by setting a target for the use of generics in hospitals 
to 50% of the volume of pharmaceuticals used in hospitals. 
However, policy implementation regarding pharmaceuticals was faced with a number of 
hurdles. Data limitations, out-dated and complex administrative procedures, weak/limited 
information flows across relevant agencies and important vested interests led to 
implementation delays of crucial reforms. As a consequence, public expenditure on outpatient 
pharmaceuticals was still 1.7% of GDP in 2011 (about € 3 700 million, following a rebate 
from pharmaceutical industry).  
Nevertheless, several important changes have been introduced since the start of the Economic 
Adjustment Programme and an important reform impetus in the area of pharmaceuticals took 
place in March 2012 with the start of the Second Economic Adjustment Programme. 
Legislation has been passed in Parliament and Ministerial Decrees have been published. The 
target was revised to 1
1/3
% of GDP by 2012 (about € 2 880 million) and 1% of GDP by 2014. 
Authorities are now focusing on the implementation of the policies agreed in March 2012 and 
policy impact is starting to be visible. 
Reforms meant deep policy changes and were directed at pricing, prescription, monitoring 
assessment, mark-ups for wholesalers and pharmacies, more use of generic pharmaceuticals 
and a tighter monitoring and assessment of prescription, consumption and expenditure. It was 
felt that there was room to reduce expenditure via significant cuts in waste, fraud and 
corruption, which had led to over-prescription or prescription of the most expensive 
pharmaceuticals in detriment of cheaper ones. These measures intended to improve public 
finances but also benefit patients.  
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Regarding pricing and reimbursement of pharmaceuticals, authorities have: 
Measures on pricing Measures on reimbursement 
Introduced an external price reference system for 
pricing medicines, so that price is set on the basis of 
the three lowest prices of 23 EU Member States 
Introduced legislation reducing the price of generic 
medicines to 40% of the branded product with the 
same active substance; 
Introduced legislation reducing  the price of off-
patent medicines to 50% of their price when patent 
expires; 
Reduced fixed mark-ups for wholesalers and 
pharmacies; 
Introduced a fixed flat fee for expensive medicines to 
reduce the possible incentive for pharmacies to sell 
the most expensive medicine; 
Introduced a progressive rebate system on the 
turnover of pharmacies for those with turnovers 
above a certain threshold; 
Concentrated market authorisation, pricing and 
reimbursement decisions under the Ministry of 
Health to induce faster pricing and reimbursement 
decisions. 
Introduced a negative list of non-reimbursed 
medicines; 
Revised the list of over-the-counter medicines; 
Introduced a positive list of reimbursed medicines; 
Reclassified some diseases and therefore respective 
medicines in order to reduce the number of medicines 
in the lowest co-payment (0%) group; 
Created therapeutic reference groups, although so far 
they have not been used for the purpose of setting a 
reference price for reimbursement for patients. 
Therapeutic groups have been used to help defining 
prescription guidelines and to obtain the rebate from 
pharmaceutical companies. 
 
 
Regarding prescription, monitoring and assessment of prescription behaviour, authorities 
have: 
Measures changing prescription rules Measures strengthening the monitoring and 
assessment of prescription behaviour 
Introduced compulsory e-prescription for all 
physicians with a contract with EOPYY or the NHS; 
Introduced sanctions and penalties in the case of 
fraudulent prescription behaviour; 
Defining prescription guidelines based on 
international good practice and together with the 
different medical specialties. These are to become 
gradually compulsory; 
Introduced compulsory prescription by INN (active 
substance) in a gradual manner, starting with the 10 
most common active substances. 
Started to conduct basic analysis of prescription data 
generated by e-prescription; 
Started to provide feedback to physicians on their 
prescription behaviour. 
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In the field of generics, it was felt that generic consumption was very low by EU standards, 
despite the importance of the Greek generic industry. The low consumption was partly due to 
1) generic prices being very high, fixed at 90% of the price of the branded product and 2) the 
lack of price competition between them, i.e. 90% was fixed for all the generics. In addition, 
there was no use of centralised procurement procedures and NHS hospitals did not necessarily 
use generics even when these were available. Time to market entry was also long. Therefore, 
there was and still is much potential to increase consumption of cheaper generics.  
To encourage the use of generics, authorities have: 
Measures reducing barriers to entry Measures encouraging prescription and 
consumption 
Introduced legal changes to eliminate patent linkage 
and allow a faster process of litigation. 
Reduced price of generics (see above); 
Introduced INN prescription (see above); 
Introduced compulsory generic substitution by 
pharmacies of the cheapest available medicine 
(although price competition among generics is due to 
be introduced in October 2012); 
Created a centralised procurement agency for the 
health sector and recently launched several tenders 
for hospital pharmaceuticals. 
 
 
In addition to the above policies, authorities are currently exploring the ways to introduce 
price competition in the generic and off-patent market by setting a lower price to the 
followers. To control the overall level of expenditure and keep outpatient pharmaceutical 
expenditure within the target of 1
1/3
% of GDP by 2012, authorities have established a 
payback/clawback system which gets a payback from the pharmaceutical industry every 
quarter if the bi-monthly targets for expenditure have been surpassed. 
Regarding pharmacies, some legal changes have taken place prior to the programme, aiming 
at reducing ownership and location restrictions.  
The focus is now on fully implementing the set of measures that was legislated in 2011 and in 
March 2012. If effectively implemented, the impact of such measures on expenditure should 
be visible already at the end of 2012.  
 
3) Portugal: the case for deepening reforms and improving cost-effectiveness 
At the start of the Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal, Portuguese authorities 
identified a number of areas in the healthcare sector where there was room to improve 
efficiency and achieve cost savings. Reducing overall expenditure on pharmaceuticals and 
ensuring a cost-effective use of pharmaceuticals was set as a policy priority. A target was set 
to reduce overall (outpatient and inpatient) public spending on pharmaceutical to 1.25% of 
GDP by end 2012 and to about 1% of GDP by end 2013.  
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Reforms under the programme would intensify the strategy deployed over recent years to 
ensure cost control and increase efficiency in the sector. Portugal already had in place a 
number of policies to control public expenditure on pharmaceuticals. However, these 
measures were not sufficient to achieve the desired savings. Thus, it was felt that reforms 
could be deepened in line with the experience of other EU Member States. In 2010, public 
expenditure on outpatient pharmaceuticals was approximately 1.2% of GDP according to the 
national satellite accounts of National Statistical Office (INE) and, therefore, above the 1.1% 
average for the EU.  
In particular, the following policies were considered to realize important savings: changes in 
pricing in general and a reduction in the price of generics more specifically; a reduction of the 
mark-ups for wholesalers and pharmacies; changes in prescription behaviour; more use of 
generic medicines and a tighter monitoring and assessment of prescription, consumption and 
expenditure. These measures intended to improve public finances but also benefit patients in 
Portugal, who pay a substantial part of the price through cost-sharing.  
In reality, important policies were implemented since the start of the Economic Adjustment 
Programme. Regarding pricing and reimbursement of pharmaceuticals, authorities have: 
Measures on pricing Measures on reimbursement 
Re-examined and changed the reference countries for 
pricing medicines. The reference countries are now 
ES, IT and SI; 
Reduced the price of generic medicines to 50% of the 
reference branded product with the same active 
substance; 
Reduced mark-ups for wholesalers and pharmacies in 
general; 
Changed the mark-up system by introducing a 
regressive mark-up profit margin to reduce the 
possible incentive for pharmacies to sell the most 
expensive medicine; 
Concentrated market authorisation, pricing and 
reimbursement decisions under the Ministry of 
Health to induce faster pricing and reimbursement 
decisions. 
Reclassified medicines into the different existing 
severity categories and, therefore, co-payment 
categories, to reduce the number of medicines in the 
lowest co-payment (5%) category. 
 
 
 54 
 
Regarding prescription, monitoring and assessment of prescription behaviour, authorities 
have: 
Measures changing prescription rules Measures strengthening the monitoring and 
assessment of prescription behaviour 
Introduced compulsory e-prescription for all 
physicians with only some limited and specific 
exemptions; 
Implemented prescription guidelines based on 
international good practice and together with the 
different medical specialties; 
Introduced compulsory prescription by INN. 
Started to conduct regular analysis of prescription 
data generated by e-prescription; 
Started to provide regular feedback to prescribers, 
comparing their prescribing behaviour with that of 
their peers and prescription guidelines (started with 
primary care, followed by outpatient care in hospitals 
and to move to inpatient settings and finally private 
physicians' offices). 
 
 
 
In the field of generics, it was felt that generic uptake was low by EU standards, despite the 
policies of recent years, and there was much potential to increase it. The low consumption 
was partly due to important legal and administrative hurdles that considerably delayed the 
effective entry of generics into the market. Centralised procurement procedures were also 
underused in comparison with other EU Member States. Therefore, to encourage the use of 
generics, authorities have:   
Measures reducing barriers to entry Measures encouraging prescription and 
consumption 
Introduced legal changes to eliminate patent linkage 
and allow a faster process of litigation. 
Reduced price of generics (see above); 
Introduced compulsory INN prescription; 
Introduced compulsory generic substitution by 
pharmacies; 
Conducted information campaigns directed at 
consumers and physicians; 
Created a centralised procurement agency for the 
health sector and launched a number of tenders. 
 
 
In addition to the above policies, authorities are currently exploring the ways to include 
prescription guidelines into the e-prescription system and making them compulsory. They 
have introduced incentives for good prescription (targets) and are considering complementing 
this with sanctions and penalties in the case of fraudulent prescription behaviour. To control 
the overall level of expenditure and keep total (hospital and outpatient) public pharmaceutical 
expenditure within the target of 1.25% of GDP for 2012, authorities have established a 
payback agreement with the pharmaceutical industry for 2011, 2012 and 2013.  
Regarding pharmacies, important legal changes had taken place prior to the programme. 
Those changes had reduced ownership and location restrictions, allowing the sale of over-the-
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counter medicines outside pharmacies, allowing the sale of medicines by pharmacies over the 
internet and allowing discounts on the co-payment part of the price. Authorities have recently 
introduced changes in the existing legislation to ensure access to pharmacies in more remote, 
less populated or poorer areas, while maintaining the liberalisation that started with the 2007 
legal changes.  
It is perhaps still early to evaluate the impact of such measures on expenditure, although total 
(hospital and outpatient) public expenditure on pharmaceuticals has seen a substantial 
reduction since 2010 and it stood at about 1.35% of GDP at the end of 2011. At the end of 
2012, the Portuguese authorities shall start an assessment of the impact of the above policies 
and will consider the need for introducing further measures. 
 
4) Romania: Controlling expenditure and improving value for money 
Romania has been and still is facing several challenges, including an exceptionally fast 
growth in pharmaceutical spending over the past years, a large amount of unpaid 
pharmaceutical bills by the public health insurer, the lack of an evidence-based list of 
reimbursable pharmaceuticals and no effective monitoring to help control fraud in the system. 
There was a substantial amount of unregistered and unpaid bills with payment delays of 300 
days and more. Considerable efforts have been made to collect the information on unpaid bills 
and to reduce payment delays and the efforts continue up-to-date. To control spending growth 
and to pay back unpaid bills, a payback system has been installed, setting an effective budget 
ceiling of around 1% of GDP for public spending on pharmaceuticals.  
At the same time, to ensure efficiency gains in the short term, a negative list of health services 
and pharmaceuticals, based on the recommendations of the technical assistance carried out by 
the UK National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), has been put into effect. 
In the same line, a new legal framework for carrying out health technology assessment shall 
be the basis for introducing new pharmaceuticals or indications in the list of reimbursed 
pharmaceuticals. For monitoring purposes, a new electronic prescription module and 
electronic health cards are expected to be operational soon.  
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18. Policy options for the European Union 
Drawing on the findings of this report, as well as on the numerous initiatives at the EU level 
related to the pharmaceutical sector (see section 1), the following policy options emerge at the 
EU level: 
 EU institutions could contribute to addressing the lack in transparency of 
pharmaceutical prices across European countries, which is contributing to the 
fragmentation of the internal market.
35
 Competent authorities heavily rely on price 
information as a basis of pricing and reimbursement decisions. Most European 
countries base pricing decisions by comparing prices in other countries (see section 4). 
However, the comparisons are very difficult, as not all countries publish prices and 
often published prices are not reflecting real prices. The EU could therefore help 
enhancing the comparability of prices of pharmaceutical products across European 
countries. 
 The EU could encourage Member States to reduce delays to market entry for generic 
products. Directive 2001/83/EC provides a framework for accelerating the registration 
and marketing authorisation of generic products (see section 7). As pointed out in the 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (European Commission 2009), Member States should 
make better use of the possibility of mutual recognition of marketing authorisations 
and establish a unified patent litigation system in Europe. These could substantially 
reduce delays to market entry especially for generic medicines, creating a large 
savings potential in several Member States.  
 The EU could help with the exchange of best practices relative to the relevant decision 
criteria for product pricing and reimbursement, as well as to the decision-making 
process itself, which is often not transparent and could be substantially improved (see 
section 5). An example of this was the "High Level Pharmaceutical Forum on Pricing 
and Reimbursement" issuing recommendations on these matters
36
 and the subsequent 
process on “platform on access to medicines in Europe under the Process on Corporate 
Responsibility in the field of Pharmaceuticals". Further, there are voluntary 
networking initiatives of competent authorities in Europe, such as the Pharmaceutical 
Pricing and Reimbursement Information (PPRI) network, resulting from an EU co-
                                                 
35
 The EU (through DG Enterprise and Industry) funds the EURopean Integrated Price Information (EURIPID), 
which provides on a voluntary participation basis of Member States, a platform for immediate price comparisons 
of all reimbursed pharmaceuticals: www.euripid.eu 
36
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/healthcare/competitiveness/pricing-reimbursement/european-
initiatives/index_en.htm 
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funded project. Today, this project is a sustainable, growing and Member State borne 
initiative. 
 Enhanced cooperation across EU Member States could be supported to find economies 
of scale and pooling of resources in the implementation of systematic HTA, such as 
through EUNetHTA. 
 Exchange of best practices, including impact assessments, could also be encouraged at 
the EU level with respect to policies favourable to generating savings to the public 
payers, whilst avoiding a negative impact on health or pharmaceutical innovation. 
These are particularly relevant in the field of promoting the use of generic medicines 
through internal reference pricing or price competition of generics (see section 6), 
price freezes and cuts (see section 11), public tendering (see section 12) and incentives 
for providers and patients to increase the rational use of pharmaceuticals (see sections 
13 to 16). 
 An exchange of best practices with regard to policies of direct expenditure control, 
such as discounts/rebates, clawback and payback policies should be undertaken, as 
these policies are becoming more popular. 
 The sustainability of public finances should be duly taken into account in all 
pharmaceutical policies at European level.  
 
19. Summary and conclusions 
This paper presents a description and an evaluation of policies aimed at containing public 
spending on pharmaceuticals in the EU.  
Pinning down policies which favour the rational use of medicines and strengthen the 
sustainability of public finances is not an easy task, as in-depth assessment of the cost-
effectiveness of different measures is still scarce, though growing. However, on the basis of 
past experience and cases studies, the following broad guidance can be drawn: 
 The decision to pay for a medicine with public money should be transparent, 
based on relevant criteria and the decisions should be revisable (Le Polain et al. 
2011). This is important, because decisions often have to strike a balance between 
conflicting objectives of health systems, such as sustainability of public finances, 
equity and quality of care. Health-technology assessment (HTA) contributes to 
evidence-based decisions and identifies those medicines which offer the highest value 
for money. Whilst HTA is mostly used to evaluate medicines, medical devices, 
clinical procedures and public health interventions are increasingly subject to HTA. 
Whilst many countries already define explicit objective assessment criteria in line with 
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HTA criteria and procedures, in practice, the decision-making process is often not 
transparent and could be substantially improved.  
 Reimbursement decisions for pharmaceuticals should be revisable, as there is risk 
that, over time, with development of new pharmaceuticals and based on additional 
empirical evidence, cost-ineffective medicines remain reimbursable, generating 
expenditures with no or little value added for the treated patients. 
 External reference pricing (ERP) gives the authorities a tool to control prices and 
thus to set one key parameter of expenditures (besides volume). It is also a 
relatively transparent pricing method and may lead to rapid savings by referencing to 
low-price countries. Price control should, nevertheless, be supplemented by other 
policies, including demand-side policies promoting the rational use of medicines.  
 Rebates, clawback and payback policies are widely used and powerful policy tool 
for cost-containment. In case of payback, they also significantly increase the 
predictability in public pharmaceutical spending. These policies should nevertheless 
be aligned with existing or additional incentives for rational use of medicines aimed at 
the distributors of medicines and physicians, as these are also decisive for controlling 
the volume of pharmaceuticals sold. 
 Internal reference pricing (IRP) is a useful cost-containment policy. When 
implemented so that it reinforces price competition and favours generic penetration, it 
generates savings without any reported adverse health effects or negative impact on 
innovation. As such, it may be preferred to free pricing schemes, even if it foregoes all 
potential savings that may be reaped in free pricing markets. IRP should be backed up 
by other policies increasing generic penetration, as these will increase the market share 
of generics and thus allow for reducing the reference prices further.  
 Allowing pharmacies to operate generic substitution leads to lower expenditures. 
It also leads to reduced product prices and an increase in the use of cheapest 
interchangeable medicines. As such, further extension of generic substitution to cover 
more European countries bears a high potential to generate budgetary savings. 
 In order to enhance the use of generics, granting marketing authorisation and 
pricing and reimbursement decisions should be accelerated. Firstly, pricing and 
reimbursement could be combined in the same process and delinked from patents, thus 
allowing taking these decisions already before a patent expires. Directive 2001/83/EC 
already provides a framework for speeding up the registration and marketing 
authorisation of generic products. The establishment of a Community patent and a 
unified specialised patent litigation system in Europe could avoid extensive delays to 
market entry of generics and generate savings for the public payers. 
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However, as on-patent pharmaceuticals appear to be the key drivers of increases in 
expenditures, generic substitution and other policies aimed at enhancing the share of 
generics can only partially contribute to cost-containment. Improving the value for 
money of patented pharmaceuticals, including through HTA remain an important 
policy priority.   
 Tendering is a well-established and successful tool for purchasing 
pharmaceuticals in the hospital setting but also more and more so in outpatient 
setting. It has a substantial cost-containment potential, through considerable 
reductions of prices. Several EU Member States could make a more systematic and 
extensive use of tendering procedures. A possibility to be explored in future is 
international tendering by a group of countries. 
 Cost-sharing may improve the rational use of medicines as patients are made 
more cost-aware and therefore demand cheaper generic pharmaceuticals. 
However, it is important that it does not lead to a decreased use of essential 
pharmaceuticals, thus negatively impacting on health. Cost-sharing has to be well 
designed to ensure the use of cost-effective medicines, while exempting the most 
vulnerable and avoid regressive financing of the system. 
 Tools for improving prescribing behaviour of doctors are widely used in the EU 
and may be regarded as standard policies aiming at the rational use of medicines. 
Combining different policies, such as electronic prescription, monitoring and 
guidelines linked with electronic systems and providing feedback to physicians 
appears an effective way of improving prescription behaviour. In addition, education 
and information tools should be enhanced where possible. INN (active substance) 
prescription and prescription quotas, possibly coupled with target budgets and 
financial incentives have been shown to be effective tools for cost-containment 
purposes. This may reduce the risk of over-prescription and wrong co-medication.  
 EU institutions could help addressing the lack in transparency of pharmaceutical 
prices across European countries, which contribute to the fragmentation of the 
internal market. 
 
To conclude, it is worth stressing that a successful cost-containment policy in public 
pharmaceutical spending requires a comprehensive regulatory framework of pharmaceutical 
markets, with a broad set of measures, in order to be able to address "strategic" behaviour and 
create appropriate incentives for all stakeholders. 
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